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e90fa482f917100d46b0534b5b36d8a9e8abeb8c
sudo/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
Todd C. Miller e90fa482f9 Rework source layout in preparation for modular sudo.
2010-02-20 09:14:01 -05:00

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/*
* Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2009 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
* Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
* Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
*
* For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
* with this distribution.
*/
#define _SUDO_MAIN
#ifdef __TANDEM
# include <floss.h>
#endif
#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <sys/resource.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stddef.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
# endif
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
# include <memory.h>
# endif
# include <string.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
# include <strings.h>
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <grp.h>
#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
# include <locale.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
# ifdef __hpux
# undef MAXINT
# include <hpsecurity.h>
# else
# include <sys/security.h>
# endif /* __hpux */
# include <prot.h>
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
# include <login_cap.h>
# ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
# include <project.h>
# include <sys/task.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
# include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP
# include <membership.h>
#endif
#include <sudo_usage.h>
#include "sudo.h"
#include "lbuf.h"
#include "interfaces.h"
#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS
# include "nonunix.h"
#endif
/*
* Prototypes
*/
static void init_vars __P((int, char **));
static int set_cmnd __P((int));
static int parse_args __P((int, char **));
static void initial_setup __P((void));
static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
static void set_project __P((struct passwd *));
static void set_runasgr __P((char *));
static void set_runaspw __P((char *));
static void show_version __P((void));
static void usage __P((int))
__attribute__((__noreturn__));
static void usage_excl __P((int))
__attribute__((__noreturn__));
static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **, char **));
extern void rebuild_env __P((int, int));
void validate_env_vars __P((struct list_member *));
void insert_env_vars __P((struct list_member *));
/*
* Globals
*/
int Argc, NewArgc;
char **Argv, **NewArgv;
char *prev_user;
static int user_closefrom = -1;
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
struct passwd *auth_pw, *list_pw;
struct interface *interfaces;
int num_interfaces;
int tgetpass_flags;
int long_list;
uid_t timestamp_uid;
extern int errorlineno;
extern int parse_error;
extern char *errorfile;
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
static struct rlimit corelimit;
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
char *login_style;
#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp;
static char *runas_user;
static char *runas_group;
static struct sudo_nss_list *snl;
/* For getopt(3) */
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int
main(argc, argv, envp)
int argc;
char **argv;
char **envp;
{
int sources = 0, validated;
int fd, cmnd_status, sudo_mode, pwflag, rc = 0;
sigaction_t sa;
struct sudo_nss *nss;
#if defined(SUDO_DEVEL) && defined(__OpenBSD__)
extern char *malloc_options;
malloc_options = "AFGJPR";
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
#endif
Argv = argv;
if ((Argc = argc) < 1)
usage(1);
/* Must be done as the first thing... */
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
(void) set_auth_parameters(Argc, Argv);
# ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS
initprivs();
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
if (geteuid() != 0)
errorx(1, "must be setuid root");
/*
* Signal setup:
* Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
* us at some point and avoid the logging.
* Install handler to wait for children when they exit.
*/
zero_bytes(&sa, sizeof(sa));
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int);
(void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit);
(void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp);
/*
* Turn off core dumps and make sure fds 0-2 are open.
*/
initial_setup();
sudo_setpwent();
sudo_setgrent();
/* Parse our arguments. */
sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv);
/* Setup defaults data structures. */
init_defaults();
/* Load the list of local ip addresses and netmasks. */
load_interfaces();
pwflag = 0;
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL))
user_cmnd = "shell";
else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
user_cmnd = "sudoedit";
else {
switch (sudo_mode) {
case MODE_VERSION:
show_version();
break;
case MODE_HELP:
usage(0);
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
case MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_INVALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "validate";
pwflag = I_VERIFYPW;
break;
case MODE_KILL:
case MODE_INVALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "kill";
pwflag = -1;
break;
case MODE_LISTDEFS:
list_options();
exit(0);
break;
case MODE_LIST:
case MODE_LIST|MODE_INVALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "list";
pwflag = I_LISTPW;
break;
case MODE_CHECK:
case MODE_CHECK|MODE_INVALIDATE:
pwflag = I_LISTPW;
break;
}
}
/* Must have a command to run... */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0)
usage(1);
init_vars(sudo_mode, envp); /* XXX - move this later? */
#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS
sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_init(); /* initialise nonunix groups impl */
#endif /* USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS */
/* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */
snl = sudo_read_nss();
/* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */
tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) {
sources++;
nss->setdefs(nss);
}
}
if (sources == 0)
log_error(0, "no valid sudoers sources found, quitting");
/* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */
/*
* Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers.
* Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we
* defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it.
*/
if (runas_group != NULL) {
set_runasgr(runas_group);
if (runas_user != NULL)
set_runaspw(runas_user);
} else
set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default);
if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS))
log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries");
/* Set login class if applicable. */
set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
/* Update initial shell now that runas is set. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))
NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell;
/* This goes after sudoers is parsed since it may have timestamp options. */
if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
cleanup(0);
exit(0);
}
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n",
getprogname());
exit(1);
}
/* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
if (!def_closefrom_override)
errorx(1, "you are not permitted to use the -C option");
else
def_closefrom = user_closefrom;
}
cmnd_status = set_cmnd(sudo_mode);
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) {
warningx("unable to set locale to \"%s\", using \"C\"",
def_sudoers_locale);
setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
}
#endif
validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST;
tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag);
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
/* Handle "= auth" in netsvc.conf */
if (nss->ret_if_found)
break;
} else {
/* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */
if (nss->ret_if_notfound)
break;
}
}
#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS
/* Finished with the groupcheck code */
sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_cleanup();
#endif
if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
#endif
/* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */
if (runas_pw == NULL)
set_runaspw(user_name);
/*
* Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
*/
if (def_timestampowner) {
struct passwd *pw;
if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
else
pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
if (!pw)
log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user",
def_timestampowner);
timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
}
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
def_preserve_groups = TRUE;
/* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs)
usage(1);
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
if (def_requiretty) {
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, "no tty");
log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo");
} else
(void) close(fd);
}
/* Use askpass value from sudoers unless user specified their own. */
if (def_askpass && !user_askpass)
user_askpass = def_askpass;
/* User may have overridden environment resetting via the -E flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv)
def_env_reset = FALSE;
/* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
rebuild_env(sudo_mode, def_noexec);
/* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
auth_pw = get_authpw();
/* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
if (def_authenticate)
check_user(validated, sudo_mode);
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
/* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
sudo_user.pw = pw;
#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP
mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid);
#endif
}
}
}
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, "command in current directory");
errorx(1, "ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
errorx(1, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
}
/* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV))
log_error(NO_MAIL,
"sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment");
else
validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
}
#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_TRANSCRIPT
/* Get next session ID so we can log it. */
if (def_transcript && ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)))
script_nextid();
#endif
log_allowed(validated);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK))
rc = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST))
display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
/* Cleanup sudoers sources */
tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
nss->close(nss);
/* Deferred exit due to sudo_ldap_close() */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST)))
exit(rc);
/*
* Set umask based on sudoers.
* If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too
* unless umask_override is set.
*/
if (def_umask != 0777) {
if (def_umask_override) {
umask(def_umask);
} else {
mode_t mask = umask(def_umask);
mask |= def_umask;
if (mask != def_umask)
umask(mask);
}
}
/* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
/* Must audit before uid change. */
audit_success(NewArgv);
#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_TRANSCRIPT
/* Open tty as needed */
if (def_transcript)
script_setup();
#endif
/* Become specified user or root if executing a command. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
char *p;
/* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
p = NewArgv[0];
*p = '-';
NewArgv[0] = p;
/* Change to target user's homedir. */
if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1)
warning("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir);
#if defined(__linux__) || defined(_AIX)
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, TRUE);
#endif
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp));
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
if (def_env_file)
read_env_file(def_env_file, FALSE);
/* Insert user-specified environment variables. */
insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
/* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */
(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
/* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
/* Move pty master/slave to low numbered fd and close the rest. */
#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_TRANSCRIPT
fd = def_transcript ? script_duplow(def_closefrom) : def_closefrom;
closefrom(fd);
#else
closefrom(def_closefrom);
#endif
#ifdef PROFILING
exit(0);
#endif
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) {
syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_ERR, "fork"); /* XXX */
exit(0);
}
#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_TRANSCRIPT
if (def_transcript)
script_execv(safe_cmnd, NewArgv);
else
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
if (is_selinux_enabled() > 0 && user_role != NULL)
selinux_exec(user_role, user_type, NewArgv);
else
#endif
execv(safe_cmnd, NewArgv);
/*
* If we got here then execve() failed...
*/
if (errno == ENOEXEC) {
NewArgv--; /* at least one extra slot... */
NewArgv[0] = "sh";
NewArgv[1] = safe_cmnd;
execv(_PATH_BSHELL, NewArgv);
}
warning("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd);
exit(127);
} else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, "No user or host");
log_denial(validated, 1);
exit(1);
} else {
if (def_path_info) {
/*
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
* *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
* have to say "not allowed to run foo" even when the problem
* is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
* their path to just contain a single dir.
*/
log_denial(validated,
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
warningx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
warningx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else {
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
log_denial(validated, 1);
}
audit_failure(NewArgv, "validation failure");
exit(1);
}
exit(0); /* not reached */
}
/*
* Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
* load the ``interfaces'' array.
*/
static void
init_vars(sudo_mode, envp)
int sudo_mode;
char **envp;
{
char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
int nohostname;
/* Sanity check command from user. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX)
errorx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
#endif /* HAVE_TZSET */
/* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
(void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
/*
* We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want
* sudo to block if DNS or NIS is hosed.
* "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and
* "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname.
*/
nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost));
if (nohostname)
user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
else {
thost[sizeof(thost) - 1] = '\0';
user_host = estrdup(thost);
if (def_fqdn) {
/* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */
user_shost = user_host;
} else {
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
*p = '.';
} else {
user_shost = user_host;
}
}
}
if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO)) ||
(p = ttyname(STDERR_FILENO))) {
user_tty = user_ttypath = estrdup(p);
if (strncmp(user_tty, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
user_tty += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
} else
user_tty = "unknown";
for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) {
/* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */
switch (**ep) {
case 'D':
if (strncmp("DISPLAY=", *ep, 8) == 0)
user_display = *ep + 8;
break;
case 'K':
if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0)
user_ccname = *ep + 11;
break;
case 'P':
if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0)
user_path = *ep + 5;
break;
case 'S':
if (strncmp("SHELL=", *ep, 6) == 0)
user_shell = *ep + 6;
else if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0)
user_prompt = *ep + 12;
else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
prev_user = *ep + 10;
else if (strncmp("SUDO_ASKPASS=", *ep, 13) == 0)
user_askpass = *ep + 13;
break;
}
}
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
* if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
* can read the shadow passwd file if necessary.
*/
if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
/* Need to make a fake struct passwd for logging to work. */
struct passwd pw;
char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
pw.pw_uid = getuid();
(void) snprintf(pw_name, sizeof(pw_name), "%lu",
(unsigned long) pw.pw_uid);
pw.pw_name = pw_name;
sudo_user.pw = &pw;
/*
* If we are in -k/-K mode, just spew to stderr. It is not unusual for
* users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to
* be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
*/
if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE)
errorx(1, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name);
log_error(0, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name);
}
#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP
mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid);
#endif
if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0')
user_shell = estrdup(sudo_user.pw->pw_shell);
/* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
#ifdef HAVE_GETGROUPS
if ((user_ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL)) > 0) {
user_groups = emalloc2(user_ngroups, sizeof(GETGROUPS_T));
if (getgroups(user_ngroups, user_groups) < 0)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get group vector");
}
#endif
if (def_fqdn)
set_fqdn(); /* may call log_error() */
if (nohostname)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
/*
* Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
*/
set_perms(PERM_USER);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
warningx("cannot get working directory");
(void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
}
} else
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
/*
* If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo
* NewArgv and NewArgc.
*/
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
NewArgv--;
NewArgc++;
NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit";
} else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) {
char **av;
/* Allocate an extra slot for execve() failure (ENOEXEC). */
av = (char **) emalloc2(5, sizeof(char *));
av++;
av[0] = user_shell; /* may be updated later */
if (NewArgc > 0) {
size_t size;
char *cmnd, *src, *dst, *end;
size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc - 1] - NewArgv[0]) +
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc - 1]) + 1;
cmnd = emalloc(size);
src = NewArgv[0];
dst = cmnd;
for (end = src + size - 1; src < end; src++, dst++)
*dst = *src == 0 ? ' ' : *src;
*dst = '\0';
av[1] = "-c";
av[2] = cmnd;
NewArgc = 2;
}
av[++NewArgc] = NULL;
NewArgv = av;
}
}
/*
* Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables
* and apply any command-specific defaults entries.
*/
static int
set_cmnd(sudo_mode)
int sudo_mode;
{
int rval;
/* Set project if applicable. */
set_project(runas_pw);
/* Resolve the path and return. */
rval = FOUND;
user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat));
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (rval != FOUND) {
/* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
set_perms(PERM_USER);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
}
}
/* set user_args */
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, **from;
size_t size, n;
/* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */
if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) {
size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
} else {
for (size = 0, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++)
size += strlen(*from) + 1;
}
/* Alloc and build up user_args. */
user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args));
if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
errorx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow");
to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
}
}
if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
user_base++;
else
user_base = user_cmnd;
if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND))
log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries");
if (!runas_user && !runas_group)
set_runaspw(def_runas_default); /* may have been updated above */
return(rval);
}
/*
* Command line argument parsing.
* Sets NewArgc and NewArgv which corresponds to the argc/argv we'll use
* for the command to be run (if we are running one).
*/
static int
parse_args(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
int mode = 0; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */
int flags = 0; /* mode flags */
int valid_flags, ch;
/* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */
if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0)
mode = MODE_EDIT;
/* Returns true if the last option string was "--" */
#define got_end_of_args (optind > 1 && argv[optind - 1][0] == '-' && \
argv[optind - 1][1] == '-' && argv[optind - 1][2] == '\0')
/* Returns true if next option is an environment variable */
#define is_envar (optind < argc && argv[optind][0] != '/' && \
strchr(argv[optind], '=') != NULL)
/* Flags allowed when running a command */
valid_flags = MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|
MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|
MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS|MODE_SHELL;
for (;;) {
/*
* We disable arg permutation for GNU getopt().
* Some trickiness is required to allow environment variables
* to be interspersed with command line options.
*/
if ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "+Aa:bC:c:Eeg:HhiKkLlnPp:r:Sst:U:u:Vv")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'A':
SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_ASKPASS);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
case 'a':
login_style = optarg;
break;
#endif
case 'b':
SET(flags, MODE_BACKGROUND);
break;
case 'C':
if ((user_closefrom = atoi(optarg)) < 3) {
warningx("the argument to -C must be at least 3");
usage(1);
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
case 'c':
login_class = optarg;
def_use_loginclass = TRUE;
break;
#endif
case 'E':
SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV);
break;
case 'e':
if (mode && mode != MODE_EDIT)
usage_excl(1);
mode = MODE_EDIT;
valid_flags = MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
break;
case 'g':
runas_group = optarg;
break;
case 'H':
SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME);
break;
case 'h':
if (mode && mode != MODE_HELP) {
if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") != 0)
usage_excl(1);
}
mode = MODE_HELP;
valid_flags = 0;
break;
case 'i':
SET(flags, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL);
def_env_reset = TRUE;
break;
case 'k':
SET(flags, MODE_INVALIDATE);
break;
case 'K':
if (mode && mode != MODE_KILL)
usage_excl(1);
mode = MODE_KILL;
valid_flags = 0;
break;
case 'L':
if (mode && mode != MODE_LISTDEFS)
usage_excl(1);
mode = MODE_LISTDEFS;
valid_flags = MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
break;
case 'l':
if (mode) {
if (mode == MODE_LIST)
long_list = 1;
else
usage_excl(1);
}
mode = MODE_LIST;
valid_flags = MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
break;
case 'n':
SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE);
break;
case 'P':
SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
break;
case 'p':
user_prompt = optarg;
def_passprompt_override = TRUE;
break;
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
case 'r':
user_role = optarg;
break;
case 't':
user_type = optarg;
break;
#endif
case 'S':
SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN);
break;
case 's':
SET(flags, MODE_SHELL);
break;
case 'U':
if ((list_pw = sudo_getpwnam(optarg)) == NULL)
errorx(1, "unknown user: %s", optarg);
break;
case 'u':
runas_user = optarg;
break;
case 'v':
if (mode && mode != MODE_VALIDATE)
usage_excl(1);
mode = MODE_VALIDATE;
valid_flags = MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
break;
case 'V':
if (mode && mode != MODE_VERSION)
usage_excl(1);
mode = MODE_VERSION;
valid_flags = 0;
break;
default:
usage(1);
}
} else if (!got_end_of_args && is_envar) {
struct list_member *ev;
/* Store environment variable. */
ev = emalloc(sizeof(*ev));
ev->value = argv[optind];
ev->next = sudo_user.env_vars;
sudo_user.env_vars = ev;
/* Crank optind and resume getopt. */
optind++;
} else {
/* Not an option or an environment variable -- we're done. */
break;
}
}
NewArgc = argc - optind;
NewArgv = argv + optind;
if (!mode) {
/* Defer -k mode setting until we know whether it is a flag or not */
if (ISSET(flags, MODE_INVALIDATE) && NewArgc == 0) {
mode = MODE_INVALIDATE; /* -k by itself */
CLR(flags, MODE_INVALIDATE);
valid_flags = 0;
} else {
mode = MODE_RUN; /* running a command */
}
}
if (NewArgc > 0 && mode == MODE_LIST)
mode = MODE_CHECK;
if (ISSET(flags, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
if (ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) {
warningx("you may not specify both the `-i' and `-s' options");
usage(1);
}
if (ISSET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) {
warningx("you may not specify both the `-i' and `-E' options");
usage(1);
}
SET(flags, MODE_SHELL);
}
if ((flags & valid_flags) != flags)
usage(1);
if (mode == MODE_EDIT &&
(ISSET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) || sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)) {
if (ISSET(mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV))
warningx("the `-E' option is not valid in edit mode");
if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)
warningx("you may not specify environment variables in edit mode");
usage(1);
}
if ((runas_user != NULL || runas_group != NULL) &&
!ISSET(mode, MODE_EDIT | MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK | MODE_VALIDATE)) {
usage(1);
}
if (list_pw != NULL && mode != MODE_LIST && mode != MODE_CHECK) {
warningx("the `-U' option may only be used with the `-l' option");
usage(1);
}
if (ISSET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN) && ISSET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_ASKPASS)) {
warningx("the `-A' and `-S' options may not be used together");
usage(1);
}
if ((NewArgc == 0 && mode == MODE_EDIT) ||
(NewArgc > 0 && !ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)))
usage(1);
if (NewArgc == 0 && mode == MODE_RUN && !ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL))
SET(flags, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
return(mode | flags);
}
/*
* Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type.
* Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error.
*/
FILE *
open_sudoers(sudoers, doedit, keepopen)
const char *sudoers;
int doedit;
int *keepopen;
{
struct stat statbuf;
FILE *fp = NULL;
int rootstat;
/*
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
* Only works if file system is readable/writable by root.
*/
if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
if (chmod(sudoers, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
warningx("fixed mode on %s", sudoers);
SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE);
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
if (chown(sudoers, (uid_t) -1, SUDOERS_GID) == 0) {
warningx("set group on %s", sudoers);
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
} else
warning("unable to set group on %s", sudoers);
}
} else
warning("unable to fix mode on %s", sudoers);
}
/*
* Sanity checks on sudoers file. Must be done as sudoers
* file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
* data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
*/
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf) != 0)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't stat %s", sudoers);
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is not a regular file", sudoers);
else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", sudoers,
(unsigned int) (statbuf.st_mode & 07777),
(unsigned int) SUDOERS_MODE);
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers,
(unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID);
else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers,
(unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID);
else if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't open %s", sudoers);
else {
/*
* Make sure we can actually read sudoers so we can present the
* user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer).
*/
if (statbuf.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) {
log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't read %s", sudoers);
fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
}
}
if (fp != NULL) {
rewind(fp);
(void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1);
}
set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */
return(fp);
}
/*
* Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps.
* Also sets the set_perms() pointer to the correct function.
*/
static void
initial_setup()
{
int miss[3], devnull = -1;
#if defined(__linux__) || (defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL))
struct rlimit rl;
#endif
#if defined(__linux__)
/*
* Unlimit the number of processes since Linux's setuid() will
* apply resource limits when changing uid and return EAGAIN if
* nproc would be violated by the uid switch.
*/
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl)) {
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl) == 0) {
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max;
(void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl);
}
}
#endif /* __linux__ */
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
/*
* Turn off core dumps.
*/
(void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
memcpy(&rl, &corelimit, sizeof(struct rlimit));
rl.rlim_cur = 0;
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
/*
* stdin, stdout and stderr must be open; set them to /dev/null
* if they are closed and close all other fds.
*/
miss[STDIN_FILENO] = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
miss[STDOUT_FILENO] = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
miss[STDERR_FILENO] = fcntl(STDERR_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] || miss[STDOUT_FILENO] || miss[STDERR_FILENO]) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0644)) != -1) {
if (miss[STDIN_FILENO])
(void) dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
if (miss[STDOUT_FILENO])
(void) dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (miss[STDERR_FILENO])
(void) dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO);
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
static void
set_loginclass(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
int errflags;
/*
* Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
* class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
* corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
*/
if (login_class)
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
else
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
if (user_uid != 0 &&
strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0)
errorx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class);
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
login_class =
(pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
}
lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0) {
log_error(errflags, "unknown login class: %s", login_class);
if (!lc)
lc = login_getclass(NULL); /* needed for login_getstyle() later */
}
}
#else
static void
set_loginclass(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
static void
set_project(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
int errval;
struct project proj;
struct project *resultp = '\0';
char buf[1024];
/*
* Collect the default project for the user and settaskid
*/
setprojent();
if (resultp = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &proj, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
errval = setproject(resultp->pj_name, pw->pw_name, TASK_NORMAL);
if (errval != 0) {
switch(errval) {
case SETPROJ_ERR_TASK:
if (errno == EAGAIN)
log_error(errflags, "resource control limit has been reached");
else if (errno == ESRCH)
log_error(errflags, "user \"%s\" is not a member of "
"project \"%s\"", pw->pw_name, resultp->pj_name);
else if (errno == EACCES)
log_error(errflags, "the invoking task is final");
else
log_error(errflags, "could not join project \"%s\"",
resultp->pj_name);
break;
case SETPROJ_ERR_POOL:
if (errno == EACCES)
log_error(errflags, "no resource pool accepting "
"default bindings exists for project \"%s\"",
resultp->pj_name);
else if (errno == ESRCH)
log_error(errflags, "specified resource pool does "
"not exist for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
else
log_error(errflags, "could not bind to default "
"resource pool for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
break;
default:
if (errval <= 0) {
log_error(errflags, "setproject failed for project \"%s\"",
resultp->pj_name);
} else {
log_error(errflags, "warning, resource control assignment "
"failed for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
}
}
}
} else {
log_error(errflags, "getdefaultproj() error: %s", strerror(errno));
}
endprojent();
}
#else
static void
set_project(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
}
#endif /* HAVE_PROJECT_H */
/*
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
*/
void
set_fqdn()
{
#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
struct addrinfo *res0, hint;
#else
struct hostent *hp;
#endif
char *p;
#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint));
hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) {
#else
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) {
#endif
log_error(MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT,
"unable to resolve host %s", user_host);
} else {
if (user_shost != user_host)
efree(user_shost);
efree(user_host);
#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname);
freeaddrinfo(res0);
#else
user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name);
#endif
}
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
*p = '.';
} else {
user_shost = user_host;
}
}
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as.
* By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
*/
static void
set_runaspw(user)
char *user;
{
if (*user == '#') {
if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL)
runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0);
} else {
if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, "unknown user: %s", user);
log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown user: %s", user);
}
}
}
/*
* Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as.
* Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
*/
static void
set_runasgr(group)
char *group;
{
if (*group == '#') {
if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL)
runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group);
} else {
if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL)
log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown group: %s", group);
}
}
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as.
* By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common
* case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw.
*/
static struct passwd *
get_authpw()
{
struct passwd *pw;
if (def_rootpw) {
if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "unknown uid: 0");
} else if (def_runaspw) {
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "unknown user: %s", def_runas_default);
} else if (def_targetpw) {
if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL)
log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown uid: %lu",
(unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid);
pw = runas_pw;
} else
pw = sudo_user.pw;
return(pw);
}
/*
* Cleanup hook for error()/errorx()
*/
void
cleanup(gotsignal)
int gotsignal;
{
struct sudo_nss *nss;
if (!gotsignal) {
if (snl != NULL) {
tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
nss->close(nss);
}
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
}
#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_TRANSCRIPT
if (def_transcript)
term_restore(STDIN_FILENO, 0);
#endif
}
static void
show_version()
{
(void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION);
if (getuid() == 0) {
putchar('\n');
(void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS);
#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
# ifdef _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF
(void) printf("nsswitch path: %s\n", _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF);
# endif
(void) printf("ldap.conf path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_CONF);
(void) printf("ldap.secret path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_SECRET);
#endif
dump_auth_methods();
dump_defaults();
dump_interfaces();
}
exit(0);
}
/*
* Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit.
*/
static void
usage_excl(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
warningx("Only one of the -e, -h, -i, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be specified");
usage(exit_val);
}
/*
* Give usage message and exit.
* The actual usage strings are in sudo_usage.h for configure substitution.
*/
static void
usage(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
struct lbuf lbuf;
char *uvec[6];
int i, ulen;
/*
* Use usage vectors appropriate to the progname.
*/
if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
uvec[0] = SUDO_USAGE5 + 3;
uvec[1] = NULL;
} else {
uvec[0] = SUDO_USAGE1;
uvec[1] = SUDO_USAGE2;
uvec[2] = SUDO_USAGE3;
uvec[3] = SUDO_USAGE4;
uvec[4] = SUDO_USAGE5;
uvec[5] = NULL;
}
/*
* Print usage and wrap lines as needed, depending on the
* tty width.
*/
ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 8;
lbuf_init(&lbuf, NULL, ulen, 0);
for (i = 0; uvec[i] != NULL; i++) {
lbuf_append(&lbuf, "usage: ", getprogname(), uvec[i], NULL);
lbuf_print(&lbuf);
}
lbuf_destroy(&lbuf);
exit(exit_val);
}
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