
gain us anything to run as the user since an attacker can just have an setuid(0) in their egg. Running as root solves potential problems wrt signalling.
454 lines
11 KiB
C
454 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This code is derived from software contributed by Chris Jepeway
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* <jepeway@cs.utk.edu>.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
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* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor
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* may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written
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* permission from the author.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
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* INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
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* AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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* THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
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* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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* PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
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* OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
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* WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
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* OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
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* ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "config.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
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# include <stdlib.h>
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#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
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#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
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# include <unistd.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
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#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
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# include <string.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
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#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
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# include <strings.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
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#if defined(HAVE_FNMATCH) && defined(HAVE_FNMATCH_H)
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# include <fnmatch.h>
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#else
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# ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH
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# include "emul/fnmatch.h"
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# endif /* HAVE_FNMATCH */
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#endif /* HAVE_FNMATCH_H */
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#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
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# include <netgroup.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_NETGROUP_H */
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <netdb.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#if HAVE_DIRENT_H
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# include <dirent.h>
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# define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name)
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#else
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# define dirent direct
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# define NAMLEN(dirent) (dirent)->d_namlen
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# if HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
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# include <sys/ndir.h>
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# endif
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# if HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
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# include <sys/dir.h>
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# endif
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# if HAVE_NDIR_H
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# include <ndir.h>
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# endif
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#endif
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#include "sudo.h"
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#include "parse.h"
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#include "interfaces.h"
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#ifndef lint
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static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo$";
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#endif /* lint */
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/*
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* Globals
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*/
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int parse_error = FALSE;
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extern FILE *yyin, *yyout;
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/*
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* Prototypes
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*/
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static int has_meta __P((char *));
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void init_parser __P((void));
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/*
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* Look up the user in the sudoers file and check to see if they are
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* allowed to run the specified command on this host as the target user.
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*/
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int
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sudoers_lookup(check_cmnd)
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int check_cmnd;
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{
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int error;
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/* Become sudoers file owner */
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set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0);
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/* We opened _PATH_SUDOERS in check_sudoers() so just rewind it. */
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rewind(sudoers_fp);
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yyin = sudoers_fp;
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yyout = stdout;
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/* Allocate space for data structures in the parser. */
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init_parser();
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/* Need to be root while stat'ing things in the parser. */
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set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0);
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error = yyparse();
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/* Close the sudoers file now that we are done with it. */
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(void) fclose(sudoers_fp);
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sudoers_fp = NULL;
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if (error || parse_error)
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return(VALIDATE_ERROR);
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/*
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* Assume the worst. If the stack is empty the user was
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* not mentioned at all.
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*/
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error = VALIDATE_NOT_OK;
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if (check_cmnd == TRUE) {
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error |= FLAG_NO_HOST;
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if (!top)
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error |= FLAG_NO_USER;
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}
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/*
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* Only check the actual command if the check_cmnd flag is set.
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* It is not set for the "validate" and "list" pseudo-commands.
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* Always check the host and user.
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*/
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if (check_cmnd == FALSE)
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while (top) {
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if (host_matches == TRUE) {
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/* User may always validate or list on allowed hosts */
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if (no_passwd == TRUE)
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return(VALIDATE_OK | FLAG_NOPASS);
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else
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return(VALIDATE_OK);
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}
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top--;
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}
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else
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while (top) {
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if (host_matches == TRUE) {
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error &= ~FLAG_NO_HOST;
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if (runas_matches == TRUE) {
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if (cmnd_matches == TRUE) {
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/*
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* User was granted access to cmnd on host.
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* If no passwd required return as such.
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*/
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if (no_passwd == TRUE)
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return(VALIDATE_OK | FLAG_NOPASS);
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else
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return(VALIDATE_OK);
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} else if (cmnd_matches == FALSE) {
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/*
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* User was explicitly denied acces to cmnd on host.
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*/
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if (no_passwd == TRUE)
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return(VALIDATE_NOT_OK | FLAG_NOPASS);
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else
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return(VALIDATE_NOT_OK);
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}
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}
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}
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top--;
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}
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/*
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* The user was not explicitly granted nor denied access.
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*/
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return(error);
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}
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/*
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* If path doesn't end in /, return TRUE iff cmnd & path name the same inode;
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* otherwise, return TRUE if cmnd names one of the inodes in path.
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*/
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int
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command_matches(cmnd, cmnd_args, path, sudoers_args)
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char *cmnd;
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char *cmnd_args;
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char *path;
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char *sudoers_args;
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{
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int plen;
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static struct stat cst;
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struct stat pst;
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DIR *dirp;
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struct dirent *dent;
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char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
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static char *cmnd_base;
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/* Don't bother with pseudo commands like "validate" */
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if (strchr(cmnd, '/') == NULL)
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return(FALSE);
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plen = strlen(path);
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/* Only need to stat cmnd once since it never changes */
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if (cst.st_dev == 0) {
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if (stat(cmnd, &cst) == -1)
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return(FALSE);
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if ((cmnd_base = strrchr(cmnd, '/')) == NULL)
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cmnd_base = cmnd;
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else
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cmnd_base++;
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}
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/*
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* If the pathname has meta characters in it use fnmatch(3)
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* to do the matching
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*/
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if (has_meta(path)) {
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/*
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* Return true if fnmatch(3) succeeds AND
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* a) there are no args in sudoers OR
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* b) there are no args on command line and none required by sudoers OR
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* c) there are args in sudoers and on command line and they match
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* else return false.
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*/
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if (fnmatch(path, cmnd, FNM_PATHNAME) != 0)
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return(FALSE);
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if (!sudoers_args ||
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(!cmnd_args && sudoers_args && !strcmp("\"\"", sudoers_args)) ||
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(sudoers_args && fnmatch(sudoers_args, cmnd_args ? cmnd_args : "",
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0) == 0)) {
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if (safe_cmnd)
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free(safe_cmnd);
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safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
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return(TRUE);
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} else
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return(FALSE);
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} else {
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/*
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* No meta characters
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* Check to make sure this is not a directory spec (doesn't end in '/')
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*/
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if (path[plen - 1] != '/') {
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char *p;
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/* Only proceed if the basenames of cmnd and path are the same */
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if ((p = strrchr(path, '/')) == NULL)
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p = path;
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else
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p++;
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if (strcmp(cmnd_base, p) != 0 || stat(path, &pst) == -1)
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return(FALSE);
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/*
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* Return true if inode/device matches AND
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* a) there are no args in sudoers OR
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* b) there are no args on command line and none req by sudoers OR
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* c) there are args in sudoers and on command line and they match
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*/
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if (cst.st_dev != pst.st_dev || cst.st_ino != pst.st_ino)
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return(FALSE);
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if (!sudoers_args ||
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(!cmnd_args && sudoers_args && !strcmp("\"\"", sudoers_args)) ||
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(sudoers_args &&
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fnmatch(sudoers_args, cmnd_args ? cmnd_args : "", 0) == 0)) {
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if (safe_cmnd)
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free(safe_cmnd);
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safe_cmnd = estrdup(path);
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return(TRUE);
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} else
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return(FALSE);
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}
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/*
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* Grot through path's directory entries, looking for cmnd.
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*/
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dirp = opendir(path);
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if (dirp == NULL)
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return(FALSE);
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while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
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/* ignore paths > MAXPATHLEN (XXX - log) */
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if (plen + NAMLEN(dent) >= sizeof(buf))
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continue;
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strcpy(buf, path);
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strcat(buf, dent->d_name);
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/* only stat if basenames are the same */
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if (strcmp(cmnd_base, dent->d_name) != 0 || stat(buf, &pst) == -1)
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continue;
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if (cst.st_dev == pst.st_dev && cst.st_ino == pst.st_ino) {
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if (safe_cmnd)
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free(safe_cmnd);
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safe_cmnd = estrdup(buf);
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break;
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}
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}
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closedir(dirp);
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return(dent != NULL);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Returns TRUE if "n" is one of our ip addresses or if
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* "n" is a network that we are on, else returns FALSE.
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*/
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int
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addr_matches(n)
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char *n;
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{
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int i;
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char *m;
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struct in_addr addr, mask;
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/* If there's an explicate netmask, use it. */
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if ((m = strchr(n, '/'))) {
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*m++ = '\0';
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mask.s_addr = inet_addr(m);
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addr.s_addr = inet_addr(n);
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*(m - 1) = '/';
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for (i = 0; i < num_interfaces; i++)
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if ((interfaces[i].addr.s_addr & mask.s_addr) == addr.s_addr)
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return(TRUE);
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} else {
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addr.s_addr = inet_addr(n);
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for (i = 0; i < num_interfaces; i++)
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if (interfaces[i].addr.s_addr == addr.s_addr ||
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(interfaces[i].addr.s_addr & interfaces[i].netmask.s_addr)
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== addr.s_addr)
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return(TRUE);
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}
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return(FALSE);
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}
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/*
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* Returns TRUE if the given user belongs to the named group,
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* else returns FALSE.
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*/
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int
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usergr_matches(group, user)
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char *group;
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char *user;
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{
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struct group *grp;
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struct passwd *pw;
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char **cur;
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/* make sure we have a valid usergroup, sudo style */
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if (*group++ != '%')
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return(FALSE);
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if ((grp = getgrnam(group)) == NULL)
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return(FALSE);
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/*
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* Check against user's real gid as well as group's user list
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*/
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if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
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return(FALSE);
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if (grp->gr_gid == pw->pw_gid)
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return(TRUE);
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for (cur=grp->gr_mem; *cur; cur++) {
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if (strcmp(*cur, user) == 0)
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return(TRUE);
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}
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return(FALSE);
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}
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/*
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* Returns TRUE if "host" and "user" belong to the netgroup "netgr",
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* else return FALSE. Either of "host" or "user" may be NULL
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* in which case that argument is not checked...
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*/
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int
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netgr_matches(netgr, host, user)
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char *netgr;
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char *host;
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char *user;
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{
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#ifdef HAVE_GETDOMAINNAME
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static char *domain = (char *) -1;
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#else
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static char *domain = NULL;
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#endif /* HAVE_GETDOMAINNAME */
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/* make sure we have a valid netgroup, sudo style */
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if (*netgr++ != '+')
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return(FALSE);
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#ifdef HAVE_GETDOMAINNAME
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/* get the domain name (if any) */
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if (domain == (char *) -1) {
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domain = (char *) emalloc(MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
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if (getdomainname(domain, MAXHOSTNAMELEN) == -1 || *domain == '\0') {
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free(domain);
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domain = NULL;
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}
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}
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#endif /* HAVE_GETDOMAINNAME */
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#ifdef HAVE_INNETGR
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return(innetgr(netgr, host, user, domain));
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#else
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return(FALSE);
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#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
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}
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/*
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* Returns TRUE if "s" has shell meta characters in it,
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* else returns FALSE.
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*/
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static int
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has_meta(s)
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char *s;
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{
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register char *t;
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for (t = s; *t; t++) {
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if (*t == '\\' || *t == '?' || *t == '*' || *t == '[' || *t == ']')
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return(TRUE);
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}
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return(FALSE);
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}
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