Files
sudo/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
Todd C. Miller 923edabe6c Convert sudo to use BSD TAILQ macros instead of home ground tail
queue functions.  This includes a private queue.h header derived
from FreeBSD.  It is simpler to just use our own header rather than
try to deal with macros that may or may not be present in various
queue.h incarnations.
2013-10-22 09:00:37 -06:00

1057 lines
29 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2013 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
* Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
* Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
*/
#define _SUDO_MAIN
#ifdef __TANDEM
# include <floss.h>
#endif
#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stddef.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
# endif
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
# include <memory.h>
# endif
# include <string.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
# include <strings.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
# include <login_cap.h>
# ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
# endif
# ifndef LOGIN_SETENV
# define LOGIN_SETENV 0
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
# include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
# include "compat/getaddrinfo.h"
#endif
#include "sudoers.h"
#include "auth/sudo_auth.h"
#include "secure_path.h"
/*
* Prototypes
*/
static char *find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out);
static int cb_runas_default(const char *);
static int cb_sudoers_locale(const char *);
static int set_cmnd(void);
static void create_admin_success_flag(void);
static void init_vars(char * const *);
static void set_fqdn(void);
static void set_loginclass(struct passwd *);
static void set_runasgr(const char *);
static void set_runaspw(const char *);
static bool tty_present(void);
/*
* Globals
*/
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
struct passwd *list_pw;
int long_list;
uid_t timestamp_uid;
extern int errorlineno;
extern bool parse_error;
extern char *errorfile;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
char *login_style;
#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
int sudo_mode;
static char *prev_user;
static char *runas_user;
static char *runas_group;
static struct sudo_nss_list *snl;
/* XXX - must be extern for audit bits of sudo_auth.c */
int NewArgc;
char **NewArgv;
int
sudoers_policy_init(void *info, char * const envp[])
{
volatile int sources = 0;
struct sudo_nss *nss, *nss_next;
debug_decl(sudoers_policy_init, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
bindtextdomain("sudoers", LOCALEDIR);
sudo_setpwent();
sudo_setgrent();
/* Register fatal/fatalx callback. */
fatal_callback_register(sudoers_cleanup);
/* Initialize environment functions (including replacements). */
env_init(envp);
/* Setup defaults data structures. */
init_defaults();
/* Parse info from front-end. */
sudo_mode = sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(info, &runas_user, &runas_group);
init_vars(envp); /* XXX - move this later? */
/* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */
snl = sudo_read_nss();
/* LDAP or NSS may modify the euid so we need to be root for the open. */
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
/* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(nss, snl, entries, nss_next) {
if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) {
sources++;
if (nss->setdefs(nss) != 0)
log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries"));
} else {
TAILQ_REMOVE(snl, nss, entries);
}
}
if (sources == 0) {
warningx(_("no valid sudoers sources found, quitting"));
debug_return_bool(-1);
}
/* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */
/*
* Initialize external group plugin, if any.
*/
if (def_group_plugin) {
if (group_plugin_load(def_group_plugin) != true)
def_group_plugin = NULL;
}
/*
* Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers.
* Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we
* defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it.
*/
/* XXX - qpm4u does more here as it may have already set runas_pw */
if (runas_group != NULL) {
set_runasgr(runas_group);
if (runas_user != NULL)
set_runaspw(runas_user);
} else
set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default);
if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS))
log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries"));
if (def_fqdn)
set_fqdn(); /* deferred until after sudoers is parsed */
/* Set login class if applicable. */
set_loginclass(runas_pw ? runas_pw : sudo_user.pw);
restore_perms();
debug_return_bool(true);
}
int
sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
void *closure)
{
char **edit_argv = NULL;
char *iolog_path = NULL;
mode_t cmnd_umask = 0777;
struct sudo_nss *nss;
int cmnd_status = -1, oldlocale, validated;
volatile int rval = true;
debug_decl(sudoers_policy_main, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* XXX - would like to move this to policy.c but need the cleanup. */
if (fatal_setjmp() != 0) {
/* error recovery via fatal(), fatalx() or log_fatal() */
rval = -1;
goto done;
}
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
warningx(_("sudoers specifies that root is not allowed to sudo"));
goto bad;
}
set_perms(PERM_INITIAL);
/* Environment variables specified on the command line. */
if (env_add != NULL && env_add[0] != NULL)
sudo_user.env_vars = env_add;
/*
* Make a local copy of argc/argv, with special handling
* for pseudo-commands and the '-i' option.
*/
if (argc == 0) {
NewArgc = 1;
NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 1, sizeof(char *));
NewArgv[0] = user_cmnd;
NewArgv[1] = NULL;
} else {
/* Must leave an extra slot before NewArgv for bash's --login */
NewArgc = argc;
NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 2, sizeof(char *));
memcpy(++NewArgv, argv, argc * sizeof(char *));
NewArgv[NewArgc] = NULL;
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && runas_pw != NULL)
NewArgv[0] = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_shell);
}
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
def_preserve_groups = true;
/* Find command in path and apply per-command Defaults. */
cmnd_status = set_cmnd();
/* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
if (!def_closefrom_override) {
warningx(_("you are not permitted to use the -C option"));
goto bad;
}
def_closefrom = user_closefrom;
}
/*
* Check sudoers sources, using the locale specified in sudoers.
*/
sudoers_setlocale(SUDOERS_LOCALE_SUDOERS, &oldlocale);
validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST;
TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) {
validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag);
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
/* Handle [SUCCESS=return] */
if (nss->ret_if_found)
break;
} else {
/* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */
if (nss->ret_if_notfound)
break;
}
}
/* Restore user's locale. */
sudoers_setlocale(oldlocale, NULL);
if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
/* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */
if (runas_pw == NULL)
set_runaspw(user_name);
/*
* Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
*/
if (def_timestampowner) {
struct passwd *pw;
if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
else
pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
if (pw != NULL) {
timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
sudo_pw_delref(pw);
} else {
log_warning(0, N_("timestamp owner (%s): No such user"),
def_timestampowner);
timestamp_uid = ROOT_UID;
}
}
/* If no command line args and "shell_noargs" is not set, error out. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs) {
rval = -2; /* usage error */
goto done;
}
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
if (def_requiretty && !tty_present()) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("no tty"));
warningx(_("sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo"));
goto bad;
}
/*
* We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user
* specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs.
*/
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) ||
(ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv))
def_env_reset = false;
/* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
rebuild_env();
/* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
rval = check_user(validated, sudo_mode);
if (rval != true) {
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK))
log_denial(validated, false);
goto done;
}
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
/* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
if (sudo_user.pw != NULL)
sudo_pw_delref(sudo_user.pw);
sudo_user.pw = pw;
}
}
}
/* If the user was not allowed to run the command we are done. */
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
log_failure(validated, cmnd_status);
goto bad;
}
/* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */
create_admin_success_flag();
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("command in current directory"));
warningx(_("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run."), user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
goto bad;
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), NewArgv[0]);
warningx(_("%s: command not found"), NewArgv[0]);
} else {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
warningx(_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
}
goto bad;
}
/* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) {
warningx(_("sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"));
goto bad;
} else
validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT))) {
if ((def_log_input || def_log_output) && def_iolog_file && def_iolog_dir) {
const char prefix[] = "iolog_path=";
iolog_path = expand_iolog_path(prefix, def_iolog_dir,
def_iolog_file, &sudo_user.iolog_file);
sudo_user.iolog_file++;
}
}
log_allowed(validated);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK))
rval = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST))
display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); /* XXX - return val */
/* Cleanup sudoers sources */
TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) {
nss->close(nss);
}
if (def_group_plugin)
group_plugin_unload();
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) {
/* rval already set appropriately */
goto done;
}
/*
* Set umask based on sudoers.
* If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too
* unless umask_override is set.
*/
if (def_umask != 0777) {
cmnd_umask = def_umask;
if (!def_umask_override)
cmnd_umask |= user_umask;
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
char *p;
/* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
p = NewArgv[0];
*p = '-';
NewArgv[0] = p;
/*
* Newer versions of bash require the --login option to be used
* in conjunction with the -c option even if the shell name starts
* with a '-'. Unfortunately, bash 1.x uses -login, not --login
* so this will cause an error for that.
*/
if (NewArgc > 1 && strcmp(NewArgv[0], "-bash") == 0 &&
strcmp(NewArgv[1], "-c") == 0) {
/* Use the extra slot before NewArgv so we can store --login. */
NewArgv--;
NewArgc++;
NewArgv[0] = NewArgv[1];
NewArgv[1] = "--login";
}
#if defined(_AIX) || (defined(__linux__) && !defined(HAVE_PAM))
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, true);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
/* Set environment based on login class. */
if (login_class) {
login_cap_t *lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (lc != NULL) {
setusercontext(lc, runas_pw, runas_pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV);
login_close(lc);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
}
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
if (def_env_file)
read_env_file(def_env_file, false);
/* Insert user-specified environment variables. */
insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
efree(safe_cmnd);
safe_cmnd = find_editor(NewArgc - 1, NewArgv + 1, &edit_argv);
if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
goto bad;
}
/* Must audit before uid change. */
audit_success(NewArgv);
/* Setup execution environment to pass back to front-end. */
rval = sudoers_policy_exec_setup(edit_argv ? edit_argv : NewArgv,
env_get(), cmnd_umask, iolog_path, closure);
/* Zero out stashed copy of environment, it is owned by the front-end. */
env_init(NULL);
goto done;
bad:
rval = false;
done:
fatal_disable_setjmp();
rewind_perms();
/* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
debug_return_bool(rval);
}
/*
* Initialize timezone and fill in ``sudo_user'' struct.
*/
static void
init_vars(char * const envp[])
{
char * const * ep;
bool unknown_user = false;
debug_decl(init_vars, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
sudoers_initlocale(setlocale(LC_ALL, NULL), def_sudoers_locale);
for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) {
/* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */
switch (**ep) {
case 'K':
if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0)
user_ccname = *ep + 11;
break;
case 'P':
if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0)
user_path = *ep + 5;
break;
case 'S':
if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0)
user_prompt = *ep + 12;
else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
prev_user = *ep + 10;
break;
}
}
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd if we don't already
* have one.
*/
if (sudo_user.pw == NULL) {
if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwnam(user_name)) == NULL) {
/*
* It is not unusual for users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout
* file which can cause sudo to be run during reboot after the
* YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
*/
if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE)
fatalx(_("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid);
/* Need to make a fake struct passwd for the call to log_fatal(). */
sudo_user.pw = sudo_mkpwent(user_name, user_uid, user_gid, NULL, NULL);
unknown_user = true;
}
}
/*
* Get group list and store initialize permissions.
*/
if (user_group_list == NULL)
user_group_list = sudo_get_grlist(sudo_user.pw);
set_perms(PERM_INITIAL);
/* Set runas callback. */
sudo_defs_table[I_RUNAS_DEFAULT].callback = cb_runas_default;
/* Set locale callback. */
sudo_defs_table[I_SUDOERS_LOCALE].callback = cb_sudoers_locale;
/* Set maxseq callback. */
sudo_defs_table[I_MAXSEQ].callback = io_set_max_sessid;
/* It is now safe to use log_fatal() and set_perms() */
if (unknown_user)
log_fatal(0, N_("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid);
debug_return;
}
/*
* Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables
* and apply any command-specific defaults entries.
*/
static int
set_cmnd(void)
{
int rval;
char *path = user_path;
debug_decl(set_cmnd, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* Resolve the path and return. */
rval = FOUND;
user_stat = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct stat));
/* Default value for cmnd, overridden below. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt())
path = def_secure_path;
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
def_ignore_dot);
restore_perms();
if (rval != FOUND) {
/* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
set_perms(PERM_USER);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
def_ignore_dot);
restore_perms();
}
}
/* set user_args */
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, *from, **av;
size_t size, n;
/* Alloc and build up user_args. */
for (size = 0, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++)
size += strlen(*av) + 1;
user_args = emalloc(size);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
/*
* When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end
* escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces
* for sudoers matching and logging purposes.
*/
for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) {
while (*from) {
if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1]))
from++;
*to++ = *from++;
}
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
} else {
for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++) {
n = strlcpy(to, *av, size - (to - user_args));
if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
fatalx(_("internal error, %s overflow"), "set_cmnd()");
to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
}
}
}
if (strlen(user_cmnd) >= PATH_MAX) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
fatal("%s", user_cmnd);
}
if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
user_base++;
else
user_base = user_cmnd;
if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND))
log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries"));
debug_return_int(rval);
}
/*
* Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type.
* Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error.
*/
FILE *
open_sudoers(const char *sudoers, bool doedit, bool *keepopen)
{
struct stat sb;
FILE *fp = NULL;
debug_decl(open_sudoers, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
switch (sudo_secure_file(sudoers, sudoers_uid, sudoers_gid, &sb)) {
case SUDO_PATH_SECURE:
/*
* If we are expecting sudoers to be group readable but
* it is not, we must open the file as root, not uid 1.
*/
if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP)) {
if ((sb.st_mode & S_IRGRP) == 0) {
restore_perms();
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
}
}
/*
* Open sudoers and make sure we can read it so we can present
* the user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer).
*/
if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) {
log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to open %s"), sudoers);
} else {
if (sb.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) {
log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to read %s"),
sudoers);
fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
} else {
/* Rewind fp and set close on exec flag. */
rewind(fp);
(void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1);
}
}
break;
case SUDO_PATH_MISSING:
log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to stat %s"), sudoers);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_BAD_TYPE:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is not a regular file"), sudoers);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_WRONG_OWNER:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is owned by uid %u, should be %u"),
sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_uid, (unsigned int) sudoers_uid);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_WORLD_WRITABLE:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is world writable"), sudoers);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_GROUP_WRITABLE:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is owned by gid %u, should be %u"),
sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_gid, (unsigned int) sudoers_gid);
break;
default:
/* NOTREACHED */
break;
}
restore_perms(); /* change back to root */
debug_return_ptr(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
static void
set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw)
{
const int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
login_cap_t *lc;
debug_decl(set_loginclass, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (!def_use_loginclass)
debug_return;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
if (user_uid != 0 &&
strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0)
fatalx(_("only root can use `-c %s'"), login_class);
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
login_class =
(pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
}
/* Make sure specified login class is valid. */
lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0) {
/*
* Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
* class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
* corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
*/
if (login_class)
log_fatal(errflags, N_("unknown login class: %s"), login_class);
else
log_warning(errflags, N_("unknown login class: %s"), login_class);
def_use_loginclass = false;
}
login_close(lc);
debug_return;
}
#else
static void
set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw)
{
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
#ifndef AI_FQDN
# define AI_FQDN AI_CANONNAME
#endif
/*
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
* Use AI_FQDN if available since "canonical" is not always the same as fqdn.
*/
static void
set_fqdn(void)
{
struct addrinfo *res0, hint;
char *p;
debug_decl(set_fqdn, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint));
hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hint.ai_flags = AI_FQDN;
if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) {
log_warning(MSG_ONLY, N_("unable to resolve host %s"), user_host);
} else {
if (user_shost != user_host)
efree(user_shost);
efree(user_host);
user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname);
freeaddrinfo(res0);
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.')) != NULL)
user_shost = estrndup(user_host, (size_t)(p - user_host));
else
user_shost = user_host;
}
debug_return;
}
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as
* and store it in runas_pw. By default, commands run as "root".
*/
static void
set_runaspw(const char *user)
{
debug_decl(set_runaspw, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (runas_pw != NULL)
sudo_pw_delref(runas_pw);
if (*user == '#') {
if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL)
runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0);
} else {
if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, N_("unknown user: %s"), user);
}
debug_return;
}
/*
* Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as
* and store it in runas_gr.
*/
static void
set_runasgr(const char *group)
{
debug_decl(set_runasgr, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (runas_gr != NULL)
sudo_gr_delref(runas_gr);
if (*group == '#') {
if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL)
runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group);
} else {
if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL)
log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, N_("unknown group: %s"), group);
}
debug_return;
}
/*
* Callback for runas_default sudoers setting.
*/
static int
cb_runas_default(const char *user)
{
/* Only reset runaspw if user didn't specify one. */
if (!runas_user && !runas_group)
set_runaspw(user);
return true;
}
/*
* Callback for sudoers_locale sudoers setting.
*/
static int
cb_sudoers_locale(const char *locale)
{
sudoers_initlocale(NULL, locale);
return true;
}
/*
* Cleanup hook for fatal()/fatalx()
*/
void
sudoers_cleanup(void)
{
struct sudo_nss *nss;
debug_decl(sudoers_cleanup, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (snl != NULL) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) {
nss->close(nss);
}
}
if (def_group_plugin)
group_plugin_unload();
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
debug_return;
}
static char *
resolve_editor(const char *ed, size_t edlen, int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out)
{
char *cp, **nargv, *editor, *editor_path = NULL;
int ac, i, nargc;
bool wasblank;
debug_decl(resolve_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* Note: editor becomes part of argv_out and is not freed. */
editor = emalloc(edlen + 1);
memcpy(editor, ed, edlen);
editor[edlen] = '\0';
/*
* Split editor into an argument vector; editor is reused (do not free).
* The EDITOR and VISUAL environment variables may contain command
* line args so look for those and alloc space for them too.
*/
nargc = 1;
for (wasblank = false, cp = editor; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (isblank((unsigned char) *cp))
wasblank = true;
else if (wasblank) {
wasblank = false;
nargc++;
}
}
/* If we can't find the editor in the user's PATH, give up. */
cp = strtok(editor, " \t");
if (cp == NULL ||
find_path(cp, &editor_path, NULL, getenv("PATH"), 0) != FOUND) {
efree(editor);
debug_return_str(NULL);
}
nargv = (char **) emalloc2(nargc + 1 + nfiles + 1, sizeof(char *));
for (ac = 0; cp != NULL && ac < nargc; ac++) {
nargv[ac] = cp;
cp = strtok(NULL, " \t");
}
nargv[ac++] = "--";
for (i = 0; i < nfiles; )
nargv[ac++] = files[i++];
nargv[ac] = NULL;
*argv_out = nargv;
debug_return_str(editor_path);
}
/*
* Determine which editor to use. We don't need to worry about restricting
* this to a "safe" editor since it runs with the uid of the invoking user,
* not the runas (privileged) user.
*/
static char *
find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out)
{
const char *cp, *ep, *editor;
char *editor_path = NULL, **ev, *ev0[4];
size_t len;
debug_decl(find_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/*
* If any of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL or EDITOR are set, choose the first one.
*/
ev0[0] = "SUDO_EDITOR";
ev0[1] = "VISUAL";
ev0[2] = "EDITOR";
ev0[3] = NULL;
for (ev = ev0; editor_path == NULL && *ev != NULL; ev++) {
if ((editor = getenv(*ev)) != NULL && *editor != '\0') {
editor_path = resolve_editor(editor, strlen(editor), nfiles,
files, argv_out);
}
}
if (editor_path == NULL) {
/* def_editor could be a path, split it up, avoiding strtok() */
cp = editor = def_editor;
do {
if ((ep = strchr(cp, ':')) != NULL)
len = ep - cp;
else
len = strlen(cp);
editor_path = resolve_editor(cp, len, nfiles, files, argv_out);
cp = ep + 1;
} while (ep != NULL && editor_path == NULL);
}
if (!editor_path) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), editor);
warningx(_("%s: command not found"), editor);
}
debug_return_str(editor_path);
}
#ifdef USE_ADMIN_FLAG
static void
create_admin_success_flag(void)
{
struct stat statbuf;
char flagfile[PATH_MAX];
int fd, n;
debug_decl(create_admin_success_flag, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* Check whether the user is in the admin group. */
if (!user_in_group(sudo_user.pw, "admin"))
debug_return;
/* Build path to flag file. */
n = snprintf(flagfile, sizeof(flagfile), "%s/.sudo_as_admin_successful",
user_dir);
if (n <= 0 || n >= sizeof(flagfile))
debug_return;
/* Create admin flag file if it doesn't already exist. */
set_perms(PERM_USER);
if (stat(flagfile, &statbuf) != 0) {
fd = open(flagfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0644);
close(fd);
}
restore_perms();
debug_return;
}
#else /* !USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
static void
create_admin_success_flag(void)
{
/* STUB */
}
#endif /* USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
static bool
tty_present(void)
{
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC2_P_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_P_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_KI_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_KP_EPROC_E_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_PSINFO_PR_TTYDEV) || defined(HAVE_PSTAT_GETPROC) || defined(__linux__)
return user_ttypath != NULL;
#else
int fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
return fd != -1;
#endif
}