Files
sudo/sudo.c
Todd C. Miller 11127e3468 Use setpwent()/endpwent() + all the shadow variants to make sure
we don't inadvertantly leak an fd to the child.  Apparently Linux's
shadow routines leave the fd open even if you don't call setspent().
Reported by mike@gistnet.com; different patch used.
2001-05-10 18:55:12 +00:00

994 lines
25 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2000 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor
* may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written
* permission from the author.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
* INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
* AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
* PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
* OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
* WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
* OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
* ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
* with this distribution.
*/
#define _SUDO_SUDO_C
#include "config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
#include <stdlib.h>
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
#include <string.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
#include <strings.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
# ifdef __hpux
# undef MAXINT
# include <hpsecurity.h>
# else
# include <sys/security.h>
# endif /* __hpux */
# include <prot.h>
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
# include <login_cap.h>
# ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
# endif
#endif
#include "sudo.h"
#include "interfaces.h"
#include "version.h"
#ifndef lint
static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo$";
#endif /* lint */
/*
* Prototypes
*/
static int init_vars __P((int));
static int parse_args __P((void));
static void check_sudoers __P((void));
static void initial_setup __P((void));
static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
static void usage __P((int));
static void usage_excl __P((int));
static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
extern void list_matches __P((void));
extern char **rebuild_env __P((int, char **));
extern char **zero_env __P((char **));
extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *));
extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
/*
* Globals
*/
int Argc;
char **Argv;
int NewArgc = 0;
char **NewArgv = NULL;
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
struct passwd *auth_pw;
FILE *sudoers_fp = NULL;
struct interface *interfaces;
int num_interfaces;
int tgetpass_flags;
extern int errorlineno;
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
static struct rlimit corelimit;
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
char *login_style;
#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
void (*set_perms) __P((int, int));
int
main(argc, argv, envp)
int argc;
char **argv;
char **envp;
{
int validated;
int fd;
int cmnd_status;
int sudo_mode;
int pwflag;
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
sigset_t set, oset;
#else
int omask;
#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
extern int printmatches;
extern char **environ;
/* Must be done as the first thing... */
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
(void) set_auth_parameters(argc, argv);
# ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS
initprivs();
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
/* Zero out the environment. */
environ = zero_env(envp);
Argv = argv;
Argc = argc;
if (geteuid() != 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, %s must be setuid root.\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Block signals so the user cannot interrupt us at some point and
* avoid the logging.
*/
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
(void) sigemptyset(&set);
(void) sigaddset(&set, SIGINT);
(void) sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT);
(void) sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP);
(void) sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, &oset);
#else
omask = sigblock(sigmask(SIGINT)|sigmask(SIGQUIT)|sigmask(SIGTSTP));
#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
/*
* Setup signal handlers, turn off core dumps, and close open files.
*/
initial_setup();
setpwent();
/* Parse our arguments. */
sudo_mode = parse_args();
/* Setup defaults data structures. */
init_defaults();
/* Load the list of local ip addresses and netmasks. */
load_interfaces();
pwflag = 0;
if (sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)
user_cmnd = "shell";
else
switch (sudo_mode) {
case MODE_VERSION:
(void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version);
if (getuid() == 0) {
putchar('\n');
dump_auth_methods();
dump_defaults();
dump_interfaces();
}
exit(0);
break;
case MODE_HELP:
usage(0);
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "validate";
pwflag = I_VERIFYPW_I;
break;
case MODE_KILL:
case MODE_INVALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "kill";
pwflag = -1;
break;
case MODE_LISTDEFS:
list_options();
exit(0);
break;
case MODE_LIST:
user_cmnd = "list";
pwflag = I_LISTPW_I;
printmatches = 1;
break;
}
/* Must have a command to run... */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0)
usage(1);
cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode);
check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
/* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
/*
* Look up runas user passwd struct. If we are given a uid then
* there may be no corresponding passwd(5) entry (which is OK).
*/
if (**user_runas == '#') {
runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1));
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
(void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd));
runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(*user_runas + 1);
}
} else {
runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas);
if (runas_pw == NULL)
log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", *user_runas);
}
/* Customize environment and get rid of any nasty bits. */
environ = rebuild_env(sudo_mode, envp);
/* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */
if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
exit(0);
}
if (validated & VALIDATE_ERROR)
log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
errorlineno);
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
if (user_uid == 0 && !def_flag(I_ROOT_SUDO)) {
(void) fputs("You are already root, you don't need to use sudo.\n",
stderr);
exit(1);
}
/* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_flag(I_SHELL_NOARGS))
usage(1);
/* May need to set $HOME to target user. */
if (def_flag(I_ALWAYS_SET_HOME) ||
((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) && def_flag(I_SET_HOME)))
sudo_mode |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
if (def_flag(I_REQUIRETTY)) {
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo");
else
(void) close(fd);
}
/* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
auth_pw = get_authpw();
/* Require a password unless the NOPASS tag was set. */
if (!(validated & FLAG_NOPASS))
check_user();
if (validated & VALIDATE_OK) {
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
exit(1);
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
user_cmnd);
exit(1);
}
log_auth(validated, 1);
if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE)
exit(0);
else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
list_matches();
exit(0);
}
/* This *must* have been set if we got a match but... */
if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
log_error(MSG_ONLY,
"internal error, safe_cmnd never got set for %s; %s",
user_cmnd,
"please report this error at http://courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/");
}
/* Close the password file */
endpwent();
/* Reset signal mask before we exec. */
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
(void) sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
#else
(void) sigsetmask(omask);
#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
/* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */
if (def_ival(I_UMASK) != 0777)
(void) umask(def_mode(I_UMASK));
/* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
/* Become specified user or root. */
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS, sudo_mode);
#ifndef PROFILING
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
exit(0);
else
EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
#else
exit(0);
#endif /* PROFILING */
/*
* If we got here then the exec() failed...
*/
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: unable to exec %s: %s\n",
Argv[0], safe_cmnd, strerror(errno));
exit(127);
} else if ((validated & FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
log_auth(validated, 1);
exit(1);
} else if (validated & VALIDATE_NOT_OK) {
if (def_flag(I_PATH_INFO)) {
/*
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
* *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
* have to say "not allowed to run foo" even when the problem
* is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
* their path to just contain a single dir.
*/
log_auth(validated,
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
user_cmnd);
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else {
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
log_auth(validated, 1);
}
exit(1);
} else {
/* should never get here */
log_auth(validated, 1);
exit(1);
}
exit(0); /* not reached */
}
/*
* Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
* load the ``interfaces'' array.
*/
static int
init_vars(sudo_mode)
int sudo_mode;
{
char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
int nohostname, rval;
/* Sanity check command from user. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= MAXPATHLEN) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: Pathname too long\n", Argv[0],
NewArgv[0]);
exit(1);
}
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
#endif /* HAVE_TZSET */
/* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
(void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
/*
* We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want
* sudo to block if DNS or NIS is hosed.
* "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and
* "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname.
*/
nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost));
if (nohostname)
user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
else {
user_host = estrdup(thost);
if (def_flag(I_FQDN))
set_fqdn();
else {
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
*p = '.';
} else {
user_shost = user_host;
}
}
}
if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) {
if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
user_tty = estrdup(p);
} else
user_tty = "unknown";
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
* if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
* can read the shadow passwd file if necessary.
*/
if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
/* Need to make a fake struct passwd for logging to work. */
struct passwd pw;
char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
pw.pw_uid = getuid();
(void) sprintf(pw_name, "%ld", (long) pw.pw_uid);
pw.pw_name = pw_name;
sudo_user.pw = &pw;
log_error(0, "uid %ld does not exist in the passwd file!",
(long) pw.pw_uid);
}
user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell;
/* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
if (nohostname)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
/*
* Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
*/
set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't get working directory!\n",
Argv[0]);
(void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
}
} else
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
/*
* If we were given the '-s' option (run shell) we need to redo
* NewArgv and NewArgc.
*/
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
NewArgv = (char **) emalloc (sizeof(char *) * (++NewArgc + 1));
if (user_shell && *user_shell) {
NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to determine shell.", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* copy the args from Argv */
for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
;
}
/* Set login class if applicable. */
set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
/* Resolve the path and return. */
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN)) {
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path);
/* set user_args */
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, **from;
size_t size;
/* If MODE_SHELL not set then NewArgv is contiguous so just count */
if (!(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
} else {
for (size = 0, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++)
size += strlen(*from) + 1;
}
/* alloc and copy. */
to = user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
for (from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
(void) strcpy(to, *from);
to += strlen(*from);
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
}
} else
rval = FOUND;
return(rval);
}
/*
* Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3).
*/
static int
parse_args()
{
int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is suod to be run in? */
int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
NewArgv = Argv + 1;
NewArgc = Argc - 1;
if (NewArgc == 0) { /* no options and no command */
rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
return(rval);
}
while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Please use single character options\n",
Argv[0]);
usage(1);
}
switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
case 'p':
/* Must have an associated prompt. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
user_prompt = NewArgv[1];
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
case 'u':
/* Must have an associated runas user. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
user_runas = &NewArgv[1];
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
case 'a':
/* Must have an associated authentication style. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
login_style = NewArgv[1];
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
case 'c':
/* Must have an associated login class. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
login_class = NewArgv[1];
def_flag(I_USE_LOGINCLASS) = TRUE;
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
#endif
case 'b':
rval |= MODE_BACKGROUND;
break;
case 'v':
rval = MODE_VALIDATE;
if (excl && excl != 'v')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'v';
break;
case 'k':
rval = MODE_INVALIDATE;
if (excl && excl != 'k')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'k';
break;
case 'K':
rval = MODE_KILL;
if (excl && excl != 'K')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'K';
break;
case 'L':
rval = MODE_LISTDEFS;
if (excl && excl != 'L')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'L';
break;
case 'l':
rval = MODE_LIST;
if (excl && excl != 'l')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'l';
break;
case 'V':
rval = MODE_VERSION;
if (excl && excl != 'V')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'V';
break;
case 'h':
rval = MODE_HELP;
if (excl && excl != 'h')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'h';
break;
case 's':
rval |= MODE_SHELL;
if (excl && excl != 's')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 's';
break;
case 'H':
rval |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
break;
case 'S':
tgetpass_flags |= TGP_STDIN;
break;
case '-':
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
if (rval == MODE_RUN)
rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
return(rval);
case '\0':
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: '-' requires an argument\n",
Argv[0]);
usage(1);
default:
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Illegal option %s\n", Argv[0],
NewArgv[0]);
usage(1);
}
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
}
if (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & MODE_RUN))
usage(1);
return(rval);
}
/*
* Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type.
* Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''.
*/
static void
check_sudoers()
{
struct stat statbuf;
int rootstat, i;
char c;
/*
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
* Only works if filesystem is readable/writable by root.
*/
if ((rootstat = lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: fixed mode on %s\n",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
statbuf.st_mode |= SUDOERS_MODE;
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: set group on %s\n",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr,"%s: Unable to set group on %s: %s\n",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
}
}
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to fix mode on %s: %s\n",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
}
}
/*
* Sanity checks on sudoers file. Must be done as sudoers
* file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
* data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
*/
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0);
if (rootstat != 0 && lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS);
else if (statbuf.st_size == 0)
log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS);
else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS,
(statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE);
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
(long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID);
else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
(long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID);
else {
/* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
errno = 0;
if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL ||
fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) {
sudoers_fp = NULL;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
} else
break;
sleep(1);
}
if (sudoers_fp == NULL)
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0); /* change back to root */
}
/*
* Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps.
* Also sets the set_perms() pointer to the correct function.
*/
static void
initial_setup()
{
int fd, maxfd;
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
struct rlimit rl;
#endif
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
struct sigaction sa;
#endif
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
/*
* Turn off core dumps.
*/
(void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = 0;
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
/*
* Close any open fd's other than stdin, stdout and stderr.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) - 1;
#else
maxfd = getdtablesize() - 1;
#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl) == 0) {
if (rl.rlim_max != RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max <= maxfd)
maxfd = rl.rlim_max - 1;
}
#endif /* RLIMIT_NOFILE */
for (fd = maxfd; fd > STDERR_FILENO; fd--)
(void) close(fd);
/* Catch children as they die... */
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
(void) memset((VOID *)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
(void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL);
#else
(void) signal(SIGCHLD, reapchild);
#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
/* Set set_perms pointer to the correct function */
#if defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009)
set_perms = set_perms_posix;
else
#endif
set_perms = set_perms_fallback;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
static void
set_loginclass(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
int errflags;
/*
* Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
* class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
* corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
*/
if (login_class)
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
else
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: only root can use -c %s\n",
Argv[0], login_class);
exit(1);
}
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
login_class =
(pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
}
lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0)
log_error(errflags, "unknown login class: %s", login_class);
}
#else
static void
set_loginclass(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
/*
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
*/
void
set_fqdn()
{
struct hostent *hp;
char *p;
if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) {
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) {
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT,
"unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host);
} else {
free(user_host);
user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name);
}
}
if (user_shost != user_host)
free(user_shost);
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
*p = '.';
} else {
user_shost = user_host;
}
}
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as.
* By default, this is the user invoking sudo...
*/
static struct passwd *
get_authpw()
{
struct passwd *pw;
if (def_ival(I_ROOTPW)) {
if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!");
} else if (def_ival(I_RUNASPW)) {
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT))) == NULL)
log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT));
} else if (def_ival(I_TARGETPW)) {
if (**user_runas == '#') {
if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1))) == NULL)
log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
user_runas);
} else {
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
user_runas);
}
} else
pw = sudo_user.pw;
return(pw);
}
/*
* Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit.
*/
static void
usage_excl(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"Only one of the -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used\n");
usage(exit_val);
}
/*
* Give usage message and exit.
*/
static void
usage(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
(void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: sudo -V | -h | -L | -l | -v | -k | -K | %s",
"[-H] [-S] [-b] [-p prompt]\n [-u username/#uid] ");
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
(void) fprintf(stderr, "[-c class] ");
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
(void) fprintf(stderr, "[-a auth_type] ");
#endif
(void) fprintf(stderr, "-s | <command>\n");
exit(exit_val);
}