
if available. Added stay_setuid option for systems that have libraries that perform extra paranoia checks in system libraries for setuid programs (ie: anything with issetugid(2)).
1126 lines
28 KiB
C
1126 lines
28 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1994-1996,1998-2000 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
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* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor
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* may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written
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* permission from the author.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
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* INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
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* AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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* THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
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* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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* PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
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* OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
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* WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
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* OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
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* ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
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* with this distribution.
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*/
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#define _SUDO_SUDO_C
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#include "config.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
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#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
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#include <unistd.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
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#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
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#include <string.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
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#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
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#include <strings.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netdb.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <sys/resource.h>
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#endif
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#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
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# ifdef __hpux
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# undef MAXINT
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# include <hpsecurity.h>
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# else
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# include <sys/security.h>
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# endif /* __hpux */
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# include <prot.h>
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#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
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#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
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# include <login_cap.h>
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# ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
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# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
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# endif
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#endif
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#include "sudo.h"
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#include "interfaces.h"
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#include "version.h"
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#ifndef STDC_HEADERS
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extern char *getenv __P((char *));
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#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
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#ifndef lint
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static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo$";
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#endif /* lint */
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/* XXX - for debugging, will become a runtime option */
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#ifdef STAY_SETUID
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# define SETUID(_x) seteuid(_x)
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#else
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# define SETUID(_x) setuid(_x)
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#endif /* XXX */
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/*
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* Local type declarations
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*/
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struct env_table {
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char *name;
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int len;
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};
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/*
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* Prototypes
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*/
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static int parse_args __P((void));
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static void usage __P((int));
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static void usage_excl __P((int));
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static void check_sudoers __P((void));
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static int init_vars __P((int));
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static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
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static void add_env __P((int));
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static void clean_env __P((char **, struct env_table *, struct env_table *));
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static void initial_setup __P((void));
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static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
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extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
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extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *));
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extern void list_matches __P((void));
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/*
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* Globals
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*/
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int Argc;
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char **Argv;
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int NewArgc = 0;
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char **NewArgv = NULL;
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struct sudo_user sudo_user;
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struct passwd *auth_pw;
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FILE *sudoers_fp = NULL;
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struct interface *interfaces;
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int num_interfaces;
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int tgetpass_flags;
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extern int errorlineno;
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char *runas_homedir = NULL; /* XXX */
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#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
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static struct rlimit corelimit;
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#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
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#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
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login_cap_t *lc;
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#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
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#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
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char *login_style;
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#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
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/*
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* Table of "bad" envariables to remove and len for strncmp()
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*/
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static struct env_table badenv_table[] = {
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{ "IFS=", 4 },
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{ "LOCALDOMAIN=", 12 },
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{ "RES_OPTIONS=", 12 },
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{ "HOSTALIASES=", 12 },
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{ "NLSPATH=", 8 },
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{ "PATH_LOCALE=", 12 },
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{ "LD_", 3 },
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{ "_RLD", 4 },
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#ifdef __hpux
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{ "SHLIB_PATH=", 11 },
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#endif /* __hpux */
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#ifdef _AIX
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{ "LIBPATH=", 8 },
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#endif /* _AIX */
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#ifdef HAVE_KERB4
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{ "KRB_CONF", 8 },
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{ "KRBCONFDIR=", 11 },
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{ "KRBTKFILE=", 10 },
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#endif /* HAVE_KERB4 */
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#ifdef HAVE_KERB5
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{ "KRB5_CONFIG", 11 },
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#endif /* HAVE_KERB5 */
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#ifdef HAVE_SECURID
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{ "VAR_ACE=", 8 },
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{ "USR_ACE=", 8 },
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{ "DLC_ACE=", 8 },
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#endif /* HAVE_SECURID */
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{ "TERMINFO=", 9 },
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{ "TERMINFO_DIRS=", 14 },
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{ "TERMPATH=", 9 },
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{ "TERMCAP=/", 9 },
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{ "ENV=", 4 },
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{ "BASH_ENV=", 9 },
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{ (char *) NULL, 0 }
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};
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/*
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* Table of envariables to remove if they contain '/' or '%'
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*/
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static struct env_table naughtyenv_table[] = {
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{ "LC_=", 4 },
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{ "LANG=", 5 },
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{ (char *) NULL, 0 }
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};
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int
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main(argc, argv)
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int argc;
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char **argv;
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{
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int validated;
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int fd;
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int cmnd_status;
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int sudo_mode;
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int pwflag;
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#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
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sigset_t set, oset;
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#else
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int omask;
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#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
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extern char **environ;
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extern int printmatches;
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/* Must be done as the first thing... */
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#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
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(void) set_auth_parameters(argc, argv);
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# ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS
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initprivs();
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# endif
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#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
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/* Get rid of any nasty bits in the environment. */
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clean_env(environ, badenv_table, naughtyenv_table);
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Argv = argv;
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Argc = argc;
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if (geteuid() != 0) {
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(void) fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, %s must be setuid root.\n", Argv[0]);
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exit(1);
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}
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/*
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* Block signals so the user cannot interrupt us at some point and
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* avoid the logging.
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*/
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#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
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(void) sigemptyset(&set);
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(void) sigaddset(&set, SIGINT);
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(void) sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT);
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(void) sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP);
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(void) sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, &oset);
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#else
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omask = sigblock(sigmask(SIGINT)|sigmask(SIGQUIT)|sigmask(SIGTSTP));
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#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
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/*
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* Setup signal handlers, turn off core dumps, and close open files.
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*/
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initial_setup();
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/*
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* Set the prompt based on $SUDO_PROMPT (can be overridden by `-p')
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*/
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user_prompt = getenv("SUDO_PROMPT");
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/* Parse our arguments. */
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sudo_mode = parse_args();
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/* Setup defaults data structures. */
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init_defaults();
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/* Load the list of local ip addresses and netmasks. */
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load_interfaces();
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pwflag = 0;
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if (sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)
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user_cmnd = "shell";
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else
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switch (sudo_mode) {
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case MODE_VERSION:
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(void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version);
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if (getuid() == 0) {
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putchar('\n');
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dump_auth_methods();
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dump_defaults();
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dump_interfaces();
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}
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exit(0);
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break;
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case MODE_HELP:
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usage(0);
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break;
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case MODE_VALIDATE:
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user_cmnd = "validate";
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pwflag = I_VERIFYPW;
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break;
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case MODE_KILL:
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case MODE_INVALIDATE:
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user_cmnd = "kill";
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pwflag = -1;
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break;
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case MODE_LISTDEFS:
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list_options();
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exit(0);
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break;
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case MODE_LIST:
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user_cmnd = "list";
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pwflag = I_LISTPW;
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printmatches = 1;
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break;
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}
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/* Must have a command to run... */
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if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0)
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usage(1);
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cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode);
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/* At this point, ruid == euid == 0 */
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check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
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add_env(!(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)); /* add in SUDO_* envariables */
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/* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
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validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
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/* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */
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if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
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remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
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exit(0);
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}
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if (validated & VALIDATE_ERROR)
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log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
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errorlineno);
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/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
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if (user_uid == 0 && !def_flag(I_ROOT_SUDO)) {
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(void) fputs("You are already root, you don't need to use sudo.\n",
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stderr);
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exit(1);
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}
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/* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */
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if ((sudo_mode & MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_flag(I_SHELL_NOARGS))
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usage(1);
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/* May need to set $HOME to target user. */
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if (def_flag(I_ALWAYS_SET_HOME) ||
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((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) && def_flag(I_SET_HOME)))
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sudo_mode |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
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/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
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if (def_flag(I_REQUIRETTY)) {
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if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
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log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo");
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else
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(void) close(fd);
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}
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/* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
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auth_pw = get_authpw();
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|
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/* Require a password unless the NOPASS tag was set. */
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if (!(validated & FLAG_NOPASS))
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check_user();
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if (validated & VALIDATE_OK) {
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/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
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if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
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(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
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exit(1);
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} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
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(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
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user_cmnd);
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exit(1);
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}
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log_auth(validated, 1);
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if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE)
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exit(0);
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else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
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list_matches();
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exit(0);
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}
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|
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/* This *must* have been set if we got a match but... */
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if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
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log_error(MSG_ONLY,
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"internal error, safe_cmnd never got set for %s; %s",
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user_cmnd,
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"please report this error at http://courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/");
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}
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|
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/* Reset signal mask before we exec. */
|
|
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
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(void) sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
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#else
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(void) sigsetmask(omask);
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#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
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|
|
/* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */
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if (def_ival(I_UMASK) != 0777)
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(void) umask(def_mode(I_UMASK));
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|
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/* Replace the PATH envariable with a secure one. */
|
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if (def_str(I_SECURE_PATH) && !user_is_exempt())
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sudo_setenv("PATH", def_str(I_SECURE_PATH));
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|
|
|
/* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
|
|
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
|
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(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
|
|
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
|
|
|
|
/* Become specified user or root. */
|
|
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS, sudo_mode);
|
|
|
|
/* Set $HOME for `sudo -H'. Only valid at PERM_RUNAS. */
|
|
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RESET_HOME) && runas_homedir)
|
|
sudo_setenv("HOME", runas_homedir);
|
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|
|
#ifndef PROFILING
|
|
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
else
|
|
EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
|
|
#else
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
#endif /* PROFILING */
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we got here then the exec() failed...
|
|
*/
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: unable to exec %s: %s\n",
|
|
Argv[0], safe_cmnd, strerror(errno));
|
|
exit(-1);
|
|
} else if ((validated & FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
|
|
log_auth(validated, 1);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
} else if (validated & VALIDATE_NOT_OK) {
|
|
if (def_flag(I_PATH_INFO)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
|
|
* *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
|
|
* have to say "not allowed to run foo" even when the problem
|
|
* is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
|
|
* their path to just contain a single dir.
|
|
*/
|
|
log_auth(validated,
|
|
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
|
|
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
|
|
user_cmnd);
|
|
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
|
|
log_auth(validated, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* should never get here */
|
|
log_auth(validated, 1);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
exit(0); /* not reached */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
|
|
* load the ``interfaces'' array.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
init_vars(sudo_mode)
|
|
int sudo_mode;
|
|
{
|
|
char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
|
|
int nohostname;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check command from user. */
|
|
if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= MAXPATHLEN) {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: Pathname too long\n", Argv[0],
|
|
NewArgv[0]);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
|
|
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_TZSET */
|
|
|
|
/* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */
|
|
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
|
|
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
|
|
(void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want
|
|
* sudo to block if DNS or NIS is hosed.
|
|
* "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and
|
|
* "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname.
|
|
*/
|
|
nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost));
|
|
if (nohostname)
|
|
user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
|
|
else {
|
|
user_host = estrdup(thost);
|
|
if (def_flag(I_FQDN))
|
|
set_fqdn();
|
|
else {
|
|
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
|
|
*p = '\0';
|
|
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
|
|
*p = '.';
|
|
} else {
|
|
user_shost = user_host;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) {
|
|
if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
|
|
p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
|
|
user_tty = estrdup(p);
|
|
} else
|
|
user_tty = "unknown";
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
|
|
* if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
|
|
* can read the shadow passwd file if necessary.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
|
|
/* Need to make a fake struct passwd for logging to work. */
|
|
struct passwd pw;
|
|
char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
|
|
|
|
pw.pw_uid = getuid();
|
|
(void) sprintf(pw_name, "%ld", (long) pw.pw_uid);
|
|
pw.pw_name = pw_name;
|
|
sudo_user.pw = &pw;
|
|
|
|
log_error(0, "uid %ld does not exist in the passwd file!",
|
|
(long) pw.pw_uid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
|
|
|
|
if (nohostname)
|
|
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
|
|
*/
|
|
set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
|
|
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
|
|
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
|
|
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't get working directory!\n",
|
|
Argv[0]);
|
|
(void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we were given the '-s' option (run shell) we need to redo
|
|
* NewArgv and NewArgc.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
|
|
char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
|
|
|
|
NewArgv = (char **) emalloc (sizeof(char *) * (++NewArgc + 1));
|
|
if (user_shell && *user_shell) {
|
|
NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
|
|
} else {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to determine shell.", Argv[0]);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* copy the args from Argv */
|
|
for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
|
|
;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set login class if applicable. */
|
|
set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
|
|
|
|
/* Resolve the path and return. */
|
|
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN))
|
|
return(find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd));
|
|
else
|
|
return(FOUND);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3).
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
parse_args()
|
|
{
|
|
int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is suod to be run in? */
|
|
int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
|
|
|
|
NewArgv = Argv + 1;
|
|
NewArgc = Argc - 1;
|
|
|
|
if (NewArgc == 0) { /* no options and no command */
|
|
rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
|
|
return(rval);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
|
|
if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Please use single character options\n",
|
|
Argv[0]);
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
|
|
case 'p':
|
|
/* Must have an associated prompt. */
|
|
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
|
|
user_prompt = NewArgv[1];
|
|
|
|
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
|
|
NewArgc--;
|
|
NewArgv++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'u':
|
|
/* Must have an associated runas user. */
|
|
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
|
|
user_runas = &NewArgv[1];
|
|
|
|
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
|
|
NewArgc--;
|
|
NewArgv++;
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
|
|
case 'a':
|
|
/* Must have an associated authentication style. */
|
|
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
|
|
login_style = NewArgv[1];
|
|
|
|
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
|
|
NewArgc--;
|
|
NewArgv++;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
|
|
case 'c':
|
|
/* Must have an associated login class. */
|
|
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
|
|
login_class = NewArgv[1];
|
|
def_flag(I_LOGINCLASS) = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
|
|
NewArgc--;
|
|
NewArgv++;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case 'b':
|
|
rval |= MODE_BACKGROUND;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'v':
|
|
rval = MODE_VALIDATE;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 'v')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 'v';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'k':
|
|
rval = MODE_INVALIDATE;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 'k')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 'k';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'K':
|
|
rval = MODE_KILL;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 'K')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 'K';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'L':
|
|
rval = MODE_LISTDEFS;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 'L')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 'L';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'l':
|
|
rval = MODE_LIST;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 'l')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 'l';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'V':
|
|
rval = MODE_VERSION;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 'V')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 'V';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'h':
|
|
rval = MODE_HELP;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 'h')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 'h';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 's':
|
|
rval |= MODE_SHELL;
|
|
if (excl && excl != 's')
|
|
usage_excl(1);
|
|
excl = 's';
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'H':
|
|
rval |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'S':
|
|
tgetpass_flags |= TGP_STDIN;
|
|
break;
|
|
case '-':
|
|
NewArgc--;
|
|
NewArgv++;
|
|
if (rval == MODE_RUN)
|
|
rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
|
|
return(rval);
|
|
case '\0':
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: '-' requires an argument\n",
|
|
Argv[0]);
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
default:
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Illegal option %s\n", Argv[0],
|
|
NewArgv[0]);
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
}
|
|
NewArgc--;
|
|
NewArgv++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & MODE_RUN))
|
|
usage(1);
|
|
|
|
return(rval);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add sudo-specific variables into the environment.
|
|
* Sets ``cmnd_args'' as a side effect.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
add_env(contiguous)
|
|
int contiguous;
|
|
{
|
|
char idstr[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
/* Add the SUDO_COMMAND envariable (cmnd + args). */
|
|
size = strlen(user_cmnd) + 1;
|
|
if (NewArgc > 1) {
|
|
char *to, **from;
|
|
|
|
if (contiguous) {
|
|
size += (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
|
|
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
for (from = &NewArgv[1]; *from; from++)
|
|
size += strlen(*from) + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf = (char *) emalloc(size);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the command and it's arguments info buf.
|
|
*/
|
|
(void) strcpy(buf, user_cmnd);
|
|
to = buf + strlen(user_cmnd);
|
|
for (from = &NewArgv[1]; *from; from++) {
|
|
*to++ = ' ';
|
|
(void) strcpy(to, *from);
|
|
to += strlen(*from);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
buf = user_cmnd;
|
|
}
|
|
sudo_setenv("SUDO_COMMAND", buf);
|
|
if (NewArgc > 1)
|
|
free(buf);
|
|
|
|
/* Grab a pointer to the flat arg string from the environment. */
|
|
if (NewArgc > 1 && (user_args = getenv("SUDO_COMMAND"))) {
|
|
if ((user_args = strchr(user_args, ' ')))
|
|
user_args++;
|
|
else
|
|
user_args = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add the SUDO_USER, SUDO_UID, SUDO_GID environment variables. */
|
|
sudo_setenv("SUDO_USER", user_name);
|
|
(void) sprintf(idstr, "%ld", (long) user_uid);
|
|
sudo_setenv("SUDO_UID", idstr);
|
|
(void) sprintf(idstr, "%ld", (long) user_gid);
|
|
sudo_setenv("SUDO_GID", idstr);
|
|
|
|
/* Set PS1 if SUDO_PS1 is set. */
|
|
if ((buf = getenv("SUDO_PS1")))
|
|
sudo_setenv("PS1", buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type.
|
|
* Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
check_sudoers()
|
|
{
|
|
struct stat statbuf;
|
|
int rootstat, i;
|
|
char c;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
|
|
* Only works if filesystem is readable/writable by root.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((rootstat = lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
|
|
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
|
|
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
|
|
|
|
if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: fixed mode on %s\n",
|
|
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
|
|
statbuf.st_mode |= SUDOERS_MODE;
|
|
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
|
|
if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: set group on %s\n",
|
|
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
|
|
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
|
|
} else {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr,"%s: Unable to set group on %s: %s\n",
|
|
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to fix mode on %s: %s\n",
|
|
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sanity checks on sudoers file. Must be done as sudoers
|
|
* file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
|
|
* data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
|
|
*/
|
|
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (rootstat != 0 && lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
|
|
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
|
|
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
|
|
log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS);
|
|
else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
|
|
log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS,
|
|
(statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE);
|
|
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
|
|
log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
|
|
(long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID);
|
|
else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
|
|
log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
|
|
(long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID);
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
|
|
errno = 0;
|
|
if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL ||
|
|
fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) {
|
|
sudoers_fp = NULL;
|
|
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
|
|
break;
|
|
} else
|
|
break;
|
|
sleep(1);
|
|
}
|
|
if (sudoers_fp == NULL)
|
|
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0); /* change back to root */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove environment variables that match the entries in badenv_table.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
clean_env(envp, badenv_table, naughtyenv_table)
|
|
char **envp;
|
|
struct env_table *badenv_table;
|
|
struct env_table *naughtyenv_table;
|
|
{
|
|
struct env_table *entry;
|
|
char **cur;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove any envars that match entries in badenv_table.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (cur = envp; *cur; cur++) {
|
|
for (entry = badenv_table; entry->name; entry++) {
|
|
if (strncmp(*cur, entry->name, entry->len) == 0) {
|
|
/* Got a match so remove it. */
|
|
char **move;
|
|
|
|
for (move = cur; *move; move++)
|
|
*move = *(move + 1);
|
|
|
|
cur--;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (entry = naughtyenv_table; entry->name; entry++) {
|
|
if (strncmp(*cur, entry->name, entry->len) == 0 &&
|
|
strpbrk((const char *)cur, "/%") != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* Got a match so remove it. */
|
|
char **move;
|
|
|
|
for (move = cur; *move; move++)
|
|
*move = *(move + 1);
|
|
|
|
cur--;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
initial_setup()
|
|
{
|
|
int fd, maxfd;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
|
|
struct rlimit rl;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
|
|
struct sigaction sa;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Turn off core dumps.
|
|
*/
|
|
(void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
|
|
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = 0;
|
|
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
|
|
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Close any open fd's other than stdin, stdout and stderr.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
|
|
maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) - 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
maxfd = getdtablesize() - 1;
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
|
|
#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
|
|
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl) == 0) {
|
|
if (rl.rlim_max != RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max <= maxfd)
|
|
maxfd = rl.rlim_max - 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* RLIMIT_NOFILE */
|
|
|
|
for (fd = maxfd; fd > STDERR_FILENO; fd--)
|
|
(void) close(fd);
|
|
|
|
/* Catch children as they die... */
|
|
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
|
|
(void) memset((VOID *)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
|
|
sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
|
|
(void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
(void) signal(SIGCHLD, reapchild);
|
|
#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
|
|
static void
|
|
set_loginclass(pw)
|
|
struct passwd *pw;
|
|
{
|
|
int errflags;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
|
|
* class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
|
|
* corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (login_class)
|
|
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
|
|
else
|
|
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
|
|
|
|
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
|
|
if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) {
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: only root can use -c %s\n",
|
|
Argv[0], login_class);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
login_class = pw->pw_class;
|
|
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
|
|
login_class =
|
|
(pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lc = login_getclass(login_class);
|
|
if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0)
|
|
log_error(errflags, "unknown login class: %s", login_class);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
static void
|
|
set_loginclass(pw)
|
|
struct passwd *pw;
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
set_fqdn()
|
|
{
|
|
struct hostent *hp;
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) {
|
|
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) {
|
|
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT,
|
|
"unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host);
|
|
} else {
|
|
free(user_host);
|
|
user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_shost != user_host)
|
|
free(user_shost);
|
|
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
|
|
*p = '\0';
|
|
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
|
|
*p = '.';
|
|
} else {
|
|
user_shost = user_host;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as.
|
|
* By default, this is the user invoking sudo...
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct passwd *
|
|
get_authpw()
|
|
{
|
|
struct passwd *pw;
|
|
|
|
if (def_ival(I_ROOTPW)) {
|
|
if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
|
|
log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!");
|
|
} else if (def_ival(I_RUNASPW)) {
|
|
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_str(I_RUNAS_DEF))) == NULL)
|
|
log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
|
|
def_str(I_RUNAS_DEF));
|
|
} else if (def_ival(I_TARGETPW)) {
|
|
if (**user_runas == '#') {
|
|
if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1))) == NULL)
|
|
log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
|
|
user_runas);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas)) == NULL)
|
|
log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
|
|
user_runas);
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
pw = sudo_user.pw;
|
|
|
|
return(pw);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
usage_excl(exit_val)
|
|
int exit_val;
|
|
{
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"Only one of the -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used\n");
|
|
usage(exit_val);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Give usage message and exit.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
usage(exit_val)
|
|
int exit_val;
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: sudo -V | -h | -L | -l | -v | -k | -K | %s",
|
|
"[-H] [-S] [-b] [-p prompt]\n [-u username/#uid] ");
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "[-c class] ");
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "[-a auth_type] ");
|
|
#endif
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "-s | <command>\n");
|
|
exit(exit_val);
|
|
}
|