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2c18a14bd05e6d76e2025162fb60eb8cefe1b880
sudo/sudo.c
Todd C. Miller bc7803cd08 updated version
1998-02-06 20:49:24 +00:00

1036 lines
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/*
* CU sudo version 1.5.5b2 (based on Root Group sudo version 1.1)
*
* This software comes with no waranty whatsoever, use at your own risk.
*
* Please send bugs, changes, problems to sudo-bugs@courtesan.com
*
*/
/*
* sudo version 1.1 allows users to execute commands as root
* Copyright (C) 1991 The Root Group, Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 1, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*
**************************************************************************
*
* sudo.c
*
* This is the main() routine for sudo
*
* sudo is a program to allow users to execute commands
* as root. The commands are defined in a global network-
* wide file and can be distributed.
*
* sudo has been hacked far and wide. Too many people to
* know about. It's about time to come up with a secure
* version that will work well in a network.
*
* This most recent version is done by:
*
* Jeff Nieusma <nieusma@rootgroup.com>
* Dave Hieb <davehieb@rootgroup.com>
*
* However, due to the fact that both of the above are no longer
* working at Root Group, I am maintaining the "CU version" of
* sudo.
* Todd Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*/
#ifndef lint
static char rcsid[] = "$Id$";
#endif /* lint */
#define MAIN
#include "config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
#include <stdlib.h>
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
#include <string.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
#include <strings.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
#if defined(HAVE_MALLOC_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
#include <malloc.h>
#endif /* HAVE_MALLOC_H && !STDC_HEADERS */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#if (SHADOW_TYPE == SPW_SECUREWARE)
# ifdef __hpux
# include <hpsecurity.h>
# else
# include <sys/security.h>
# endif /* __hpux */
# include <prot.h>
#endif /* SPW_SECUREWARE */
#ifdef HAVE_DCE
#include <pthread.h>
#endif /* HAVE_DCE */
#include "sudo.h"
#include <options.h>
#include "version.h"
#ifndef STDC_HEADERS
#ifndef __GNUC__ /* gcc has its own malloc */
extern char *malloc __P((size_t));
#endif /* __GNUC__ */
#ifdef HAVE_STRDUP
extern char *strdup __P((const char *));
#endif /* HAVE_STRDUP */
extern char *getenv __P((char *));
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
/*
* Local type declarations
*/
struct env_table {
char *name;
int len;
};
/*
* Prototypes
*/
static int parse_args __P((void));
static void usage __P((int));
static void load_globals __P((int));
static int check_sudoers __P((void));
static void load_cmnd __P((int));
static void add_env __P((int));
static void clean_env __P((char **, struct env_table *));
extern int user_is_exempt __P((void));
extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
extern void list_matches __P((void));
/*
* Globals
*/
int Argc;
char **Argv;
int NewArgc = 0;
char **NewArgv = NULL;
struct passwd *user_pw_ent;
char *runas_user = "root";
char *cmnd = NULL;
char *cmnd_args = NULL;
char *tty = "unknown";
char *prompt;
char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
char *shost;
char cwd[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
FILE *sudoers_fp = NULL;
struct stat cmnd_st;
static char *runas_homedir = NULL;
extern struct interface *interfaces;
extern int num_interfaces;
extern int printmatches;
/*
* Table of "bad" envariables to remove and len for strncmp()
*/
struct env_table badenv_table[] = {
{ "IFS=", 4 },
{ "LD_", 3 },
{ "_RLD", 4 },
#ifdef __hpux
{ "SHLIB_PATH=", 11 },
#endif /* __hpux */
#ifdef _AIX
{ "LIBPATH=", 8 },
#endif /* _AIX */
#ifdef HAVE_KERB4
{ "KRB_CONF", 8 },
#endif
{ "ENV=", 4 },
{ "BASH_ENV=", 9 },
{ (char *) NULL, 0 }
};
/********************************************************************
*
* main()
*
* the driving force behind sudo...
*/
int main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
int rtn;
int sudo_mode = MODE_RUN;
extern char ** environ;
#if (SHADOW_TYPE == SPW_SECUREWARE)
(void) set_auth_parameters(argc, argv);
#endif /* SPW_SECUREWARE */
Argv = argv;
Argc = argc;
if (geteuid() != 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, %s must be setuid root.\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Close all file descriptors to make sure we have a nice
* clean slate from which to work.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
for (rtn = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) - 1; rtn > 2; rtn--)
(void) close(rtn);
#else
for (rtn = getdtablesize() - 1; rtn > 2; rtn--)
(void) close(rtn);
#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
/*
* set the prompt based on $SUDO_PROMPT (can be overridden by `-p')
*/
if ((prompt = getenv("SUDO_PROMPT")) == NULL)
prompt = PASSPROMPT;
/*
* parse our arguments
*/
sudo_mode = parse_args();
switch (sudo_mode) {
case MODE_VERSION:
case MODE_HELP:
(void) printf("CU Sudo version %s\n", version);
if (sudo_mode == MODE_VERSION)
exit(0);
else
usage(0);
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
cmnd = "validate";
break;
case MODE_KILL:
cmnd = "kill";
break;
case MODE_LIST:
cmnd = "list";
printmatches = 1;
break;
}
/* must have a command to run unless got -s */
if (cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0 && !(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL))
usage(1);
clean_env(environ, badenv_table);
load_globals(sudo_mode); /* load global variables used throughout sudo */
/*
* If we got the '-s' option (run shell) we need to redo NewArgv
* and NewArgc. This can only be done after load_globals().
*/
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
NewArgv = (char **) malloc (sizeof(char *) * (++NewArgc + 1));
if (NewArgv == NULL) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* add the shell as argv[0] */
if (user_shell && *user_shell) {
if ((NewArgv[0] = strrchr(user_shell, '/') + 1) == (char *) 1)
NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to determine shell.", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* copy the args from Argv */
for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
;
}
rtn = check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS */
if (rtn != ALL_SYSTEMS_GO) {
log_error(rtn);
set_perms(PERM_FULL_USER, sudo_mode);
inform_user(rtn);
exit(1);
}
#ifdef SECURE_PATH
/* replace the PATH envariable with a secure one */
if (!user_is_exempt() && sudo_setenv("PATH", SECURE_PATH)) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
#endif /* SECURE_PATH */
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN)) {
load_cmnd(sudo_mode); /* load the cmnd global variable */
} else if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL) {
remove_timestamp(); /* remove the timestamp ticket file */
exit(0);
}
add_env(!(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)); /* add in SUDO_* envariables */
/* validate the user but don't search for "validate" */
rtn = validate((sudo_mode != MODE_VALIDATE && sudo_mode != MODE_LIST));
switch (rtn) {
case VALIDATE_OK:
case VALIDATE_OK_NOPASS:
if (rtn != VALIDATE_OK_NOPASS)
check_user();
log_error(ALL_SYSTEMS_GO);
if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE)
exit(0);
else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
list_matches();
exit(0);
}
/* become specified user or root */
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS, sudo_mode);
/* set $HOME for `sudo -H' */
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RESET_HOME) && runas_homedir)
(void) sudo_setenv("HOME", runas_homedir);
#ifndef PROFILING
if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) {
exit(0);
} else {
/*
* Make sure we are not being spoofed. The stat should
* be cheap enough to make this almost bulletproof.
*/
if (cmnd_st.st_dev) {
struct stat st;
if (stat(cmnd, &st) < 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: unable to stat %s: ",
Argv[0], cmnd);
perror("");
exit(1);
}
if (st.st_dev != cmnd_st.st_dev ||
st.st_ino != cmnd_st.st_ino) {
/* log and send mail, then bitch */
log_error(SPOOF_ATTEMPT);
inform_user(SPOOF_ATTEMPT);
exit(1);
}
}
EXEC(cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
}
#else
exit(0);
#endif /* PROFILING */
/*
* If we got here then the exec() failed...
*/
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", Argv[0]);
perror(cmnd);
exit(-1);
break;
default:
log_error(rtn);
set_perms(PERM_FULL_USER, sudo_mode);
inform_user(rtn);
exit(1);
break;
}
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* load_globals()
*
* This function primes these important global variables:
* user_pw_ent, host, cwd, interfaces.
*/
static void load_globals(sudo_mode)
int sudo_mode;
{
char *p;
#ifdef FQDN
struct hostent *h_ent;
#endif /* FQDN */
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
* if necesary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
* can read the shadow passwd file if necesary.
*/
if ((user_pw_ent = sudo_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
/* need to make a fake user_pw_ent */
struct passwd pw_ent;
char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN+1];
/* fill in uid and name fields with the uid */
pw_ent.pw_uid = getuid();
(void) sprintf(pw_name, "%ld", (long) pw_ent.pw_uid);
pw_ent.pw_name = pw_name;
user_pw_ent = &pw_ent;
/* complain, log, and die */
log_error(GLOBAL_NO_PW_ENT);
inform_user(GLOBAL_NO_PW_ENT);
exit(1);
}
/* Set euid == user and ruid == root */
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
#endif /* HAVE_TZSET */
/*
* Need to get tty early since it's used for logging
*/
if ((p = (char *) ttyname(0)) || (p = (char *) ttyname(1))) {
if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
if ((tty = (char *) strdup(p)) == NULL) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
}
#ifdef UMASK
(void) umask((mode_t)UMASK);
#endif /* UMASK */
#ifdef NO_ROOT_SUDO
if (user_uid == 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"You are already root, you don't need to use sudo.\n");
exit(1);
}
#endif
/*
* so we know where we are... (do as user)
*/
if (!getwd(cwd)) {
/* try as root... */
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
if (!getwd(cwd)) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't get working directory!\n",
Argv[0]);
(void) strcpy(cwd, "unknown");
}
set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
}
/*
* load the host global variable from gethostname() and use
* gethostbyname() if we want to be sure it is fully qualified.
*/
if ((gethostname(host, MAXHOSTNAMELEN))) {
strcpy(host, "localhost");
log_error(GLOBAL_NO_HOSTNAME);
inform_user(GLOBAL_NO_HOSTNAME);
exit(2);
}
#ifdef FQDN
if ((h_ent = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL)
log_error(GLOBAL_HOST_UNREGISTERED);
else
strcpy(host, h_ent -> h_name);
#endif /* FQDN */
/*
* "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and
* "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname.
*/
if ((p = strchr(host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
if ((shost = strdup(host)) == NULL) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
*p = '.';
} else {
shost = &host[0];
}
/*
* load a list of ip addresses and netmasks into
* the interfaces array.
*/
load_interfaces();
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* parse_args()
*
* this function parses the arguments to sudo
*/
static int parse_args()
{
int ret = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is suod to be run in? */
int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
NewArgv = Argv + 1;
NewArgc = Argc - 1;
#ifdef SHELL_IF_NO_ARGS
if (Argc < 2) { /* no options and no command */
ret |= MODE_SHELL;
return(ret);
}
#else
if (Argc < 2) /* no options and no command */
usage(1);
#endif /* SHELL_IF_NO_ARGS */
while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Please use single character options\n",
Argv[0]);
usage(1);
}
if (excl)
usage(1); /* only one -? option allowed */
switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
case 'p':
/* must have an associated prompt */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
prompt = NewArgv[1];
/* shift Argv over and adjust Argc */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
case 'u':
/* must have an associated runas user */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
runas_user = NewArgv[1];
/* shift Argv over and adjust Argc */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
case 'b':
ret |= MODE_BACKGROUND;
break;
case 'v':
ret = MODE_VALIDATE;
excl++;
break;
case 'k':
ret = MODE_KILL;
excl++;
break;
case 'l':
ret = MODE_LIST;
excl++;
break;
case 'V':
ret = MODE_VERSION;
excl++;
break;
case 'h':
ret = MODE_HELP;
excl++;
break;
case 's':
ret |= MODE_SHELL;
#ifdef SHELL_SETS_HOME
ret |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
#endif /* SHELL_SETS_HOME */
break;
case 'H':
ret |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
break;
case '-':
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
#ifdef SHELL_IF_NO_ARGS
if (ret == MODE_RUN)
ret |= MODE_SHELL;
#endif /* SHELL_IF_NO_ARGS */
return(ret);
case '\0':
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: '-' requires an argument\n",
Argv[0]);
usage(1);
default:
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Illegal option %s\n", Argv[0],
NewArgv[0]);
usage(1);
}
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
}
if (NewArgc > 0 && (ret == MODE_VALIDATE || ret == MODE_KILL ||
ret == MODE_LIST))
usage(1);
return(ret);
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* usage()
*
* this function just gives you instructions and exits
*/
static void usage(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
(void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -V | -h | -l | -v | -k | -H | [-b] [-p prompt] [-u username/#uid] -s | <command>\n", Argv[0]);
exit(exit_val);
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* add_env()
*
* this function adds sudo-specific variables into the environment
*/
static void add_env(contiguous)
int contiguous;
{
char idstr[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
size_t size;
char *buf;
/* add the SUDO_COMMAND envariable (cmnd + args) */
size = strlen(cmnd) + 1;
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, **from;
if (contiguous) {
size += (size_t) NewArgv[NewArgc-1] + strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) -
(size_t) NewArgv[1] + 1;
} else {
for (from = &NewArgv[1]; *from; from++)
size += strlen(*from) + 1;
}
if ((buf = (char *) malloc(size)) == NULL) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Copy the command and it's arguments info buf
*/
(void) strcpy(buf, cmnd);
to = buf + strlen(cmnd);
for (from = &NewArgv[1]; *from; from++) {
*to++ = ' ';
(void) strcpy(to, *from);
to += strlen(*from);
}
} else {
buf = cmnd;
}
if (sudo_setenv("SUDO_COMMAND", buf)) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
if (NewArgc > 1)
(void) free(buf);
/* grab a pointer to the flat arg string from the environment */
if (NewArgc > 1 && (cmnd_args = getenv("SUDO_COMMAND"))) {
if ((cmnd_args = strchr(cmnd_args, ' ')))
cmnd_args++;
else
cmnd_args = NULL;
}
/* add the SUDO_USER envariable */
if (sudo_setenv("SUDO_USER", user_name)) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* add the SUDO_UID envariable */
(void) sprintf(idstr, "%ld", (long) user_uid);
if (sudo_setenv("SUDO_UID", idstr)) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* add the SUDO_GID envariable */
(void) sprintf(idstr, "%ld", (long) user_gid);
if (sudo_setenv("SUDO_GID", idstr)) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* set PS1 if SUDO_PS1 is set */
if ((buf = getenv("SUDO_PS1")))
if (sudo_setenv("PS1", buf)) {
perror("malloc");
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot allocate memory!\n", Argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* load_cmnd()
*
* This function sets the cmnd global variable
*/
static void load_cmnd(sudo_mode)
int sudo_mode;
{
if (strlen(NewArgv[0]) > MAXPATHLEN) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: Pathname too long\n", Argv[0],
NewArgv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Resolve the path
*/
if ((cmnd = find_path(NewArgv[0])) == NULL) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
NewArgv[0]);
exit(1);
}
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* check_sudoers()
*
* This function check to see that the sudoers file is owned by
* uid SUDOERS_UID, gid SUDOERS_GID and is mode SUDOERS_MODE.
*/
static int check_sudoers()
{
struct stat statbuf;
int rootstat, i;
char c;
int rtn = ALL_SYSTEMS_GO;
/*
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
* Only works if filesystem is readable/writable by root.
*/
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0);
if ((rootstat = lstat(_PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
if (chmod(_PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: fixed mode on %s\n",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS);
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
if (!chown(_PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS,GID_NO_CHANGE,SUDOERS_GID)) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: set group on %s\n",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS);
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr,"%s: Unable to set group on %s: ",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS);
perror("");
}
}
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to fix mode on %s: ",
Argv[0], _PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS);
perror("");
}
}
/*
* Sanity checks on sudoers file. Must be done as sudoers
* file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
* data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
*/
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0);
if (lstat(_PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0 && rootstat != 0)
rtn = NO_SUDOERS_FILE;
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
rtn = SUDOERS_NOT_FILE;
else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
rtn = SUDOERS_WRONG_MODE;
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID || statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
rtn = SUDOERS_WRONG_OWNER;
else {
/* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
errno = 0;
if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL ||
fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) {
sudoers_fp = NULL;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
} else
break;
sleep(1);
}
if (sudoers_fp == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot open %s: ", Argv[0], _PATH_SUDO_SUDOERS);
perror("");
rtn = NO_SUDOERS_FILE;
}
}
set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0);
set_perms(PERM_USER, 0);
return(rtn);
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* set_perms()
*
* this function sets real and effective uids and gids based on perm.
*/
void set_perms(perm, sudo_mode)
int perm;
int sudo_mode;
{
struct passwd *pw_ent;
switch (perm) {
case PERM_ROOT:
if (setuid(0)) {
perror("setuid(0)");
exit(1);
}
break;
case PERM_USER:
(void) setgid(user_gid);
if (seteuid(user_uid)) {
perror("seteuid(user_uid)");
exit(1);
}
break;
case PERM_FULL_USER:
if (setuid(0)) {
perror("setuid(0)");
exit(1);
}
(void) setgid(user_gid);
if (setuid(user_uid)) {
perror("setuid(user_uid)");
exit(1);
}
break;
case PERM_RUNAS:
if (setuid(0)) {
perror("setuid(0)");
exit(1);
}
/* XXX - add group/gid support */
if (*runas_user == '#') {
if (setuid(atoi(runas_user + 1))) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"%s: cannot set uid to %s: ",
Argv[0], runas_user);
perror("");
exit(1);
}
} else {
if (!(pw_ent = getpwnam(runas_user))) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"%s: no passwd entry for %s!\n",
Argv[0], runas_user);
exit(1);
}
if (setgid(pw_ent->pw_gid)) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"%s: cannot set gid to %d: ",
Argv[0], pw_ent->pw_gid);
perror("");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Initialize group vector only if
* we are going to be a non-root user.
*/
if (strcmp(runas_user, "root") != 0 &&
initgroups(runas_user, pw_ent->pw_gid)
== -1) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"%s: cannot set group vector ",
Argv[0]);
perror("");
exit(1);
}
if (setuid(pw_ent->pw_uid)) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"%s: cannot set uid to %d: ",
Argv[0], pw_ent->pw_uid);
perror("");
exit(1);
}
if (sudo_mode & MODE_RESET_HOME)
runas_homedir = pw_ent->pw_dir;
}
break;
case PERM_SUDOERS:
if (setuid(0)) {
perror("setuid(0)");
exit(1);
}
if (setgid(SUDOERS_GID)) {
perror("setgid(SUDOERS_GID)");
exit(1);
}
/*
* If SUDOERS_UID == 0 and SUDOERS_MODE
* is group readable we use a non-zero
* uid in order to avoid NFS lossage.
* Using uid 1 is a bit bogus but should
* work on all OS's.
*/
if (SUDOERS_UID == 0) {
if ((SUDOERS_MODE & 040) && seteuid(1)) {
perror("seteuid(1)");
exit(1);
}
} else {
if (seteuid(SUDOERS_UID)) {
perror("seteuid(SUDOERS_UID)");
exit(1);
}
}
break;
}
}
/**********************************************************************
*
* clean_env()
*
* This function removes things from the environment that match the
* entries in badenv_table. It would be nice to add in the SUDO_*
* variables here as well but cmnd has not been defined at this point.
*/
static void clean_env(envp, badenv_table)
char **envp;
struct env_table *badenv_table;
{
struct env_table *bad;
char **cur;
/*
* Remove any envars that match entries in badenv_table
*/
for (cur = envp; *cur; cur++) {
for (bad = badenv_table; bad -> name; bad++) {
if (strncmp(*cur, bad -> name, bad -> len) == 0) {
/* got a match so remove it */
char **move;
for (move = cur; *move; move++)
*move = *(move + 1);
cur--;
break;
}
}
}
}
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