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Work in progress support for sudoedit. The actual interface used by the

Browse Source 
plugin for sudoedit is likely to change.
This commit is contained in:
Todd C. Miller
2010-05-13 14:09:21 -04:00
parent d5bfd148d6
commit fdd28d411f
11 changed files with 279 additions and 203 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
include/sudo_plugin.h
View File

@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ struct policy_plugin {
const char *list_user);
int (*validate)(void);
void (*invalidate)(int remove);
int (*check_sudoedit)(int argc, char * const argv[],
char *env_add[], char **command_info[],
char **argv_out[], char **user_env_out[]);
};
/* I/O plugin type and defines */

3
plugins/sample/sample_plugin.c
View File

@@ -346,7 +346,8 @@ struct policy_plugin sample_policy = {
policy_check,
policy_list,
NULL, /* validate */
NULL /* invalidate */
NULL, /* invalidate */
NULL /* sudoedit */
};
/*

6
plugins/sudoers/Makefile.in
View File

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ REPLAY_OBJS = getdate.o sudoreplay.o term.o error.o
TEST_OBJS = interfaces.o testsudoers.o tsgetgrpw.o error.o
LINKS = alloc.c atobool.c error.c fileops.c fmt_string.c lbuf.c \
LINKS = alloc.c atobool.c error.c gettime.c fileops.c fmt_string.c lbuf.c \
list.c term.c zero_bytes.c
VERSION = @PACKAGE_VERSION@
@@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ defaults.lo: $(srcdir)/defaults.c $(SUDODEP) $(srcdir)/def_data.c $(authdir)/sud
env.lo: $(srcdir)/env.c $(SUDODEP)
find_path.lo: $(srcdir)/find_path.c $(SUDODEP)
getspwuid.lo: $(srcdir)/getspwuid.c $(SUDODEP)
gettime.lo: $(srcdir)/gettime.c $(SUDODEP)
goodpath.lo: $(srcdir)/goodpath.c $(SUDODEP)
gram.lo: $(devdir)/gram.c $(SUDODEP) $(srcdir)/parse.h $(incdir)/list.h $(devdir)/gram.h
interfaces.lo: $(srcdir)/interfaces.c $(SUDODEP) $(srcdir)/interfaces.h
@@ -226,6 +225,9 @@ fileops.lo: fileops.c $(SUDODEP)
fmt_string.c: $(top_srcdir)/src/fmt_string.c
@$(LN_S) -f $(top_srcdir)/src/$@ $@
fmt_string.lo: fmt_string.c $(incdir)/compat.h $(top_builddir)/config.h
gettime.c: $(top_srcdir)/src/gettime.c
@$(LN_S) -f $(top_srcdir)/src/$@ $@
gettime.lo: gettime.c $(incdir)/compat.h $(top_builddir)/config.h
list.c: $(top_srcdir)/src/list.c
@$(LN_S) -f $(top_srcdir)/src/$@ $@
list.lo: list.c $(SUDODEP)

2
plugins/sudoers/set_perms.c
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1994-1996,1998-2009 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
* Copyright (c) 1994-1996,1998-2010 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above

112
plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
View File

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP
# include <membership.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
#include "sudo_plugin.h"
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ static void set_runaspw(char *);
static int sudoers_policy_version(int verbose);
static struct passwd *get_authpw(void);
static int deserialize_info(char * const settings[], char * const user_info[]);
static char *find_editor(char ***argv_out);
/* XXX */
extern int runas_ngroups;
@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
char **command_infop[], char **argv_out[], char **user_env_out[])
{
static char *command_info[32]; /* XXX */
char **edit_argv = NULL;
struct sudo_nss *nss;
int cmnd_status = -1, validated;
int info_len = 0;
@@ -308,8 +311,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/*
* Make a local copy of argc/argv, with special handling
* for the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options.
* XXX - handle sudoedit
* for the '-i' option.
*/
NewArgv = emalloc2(argc + 1, sizeof(char *));
memcpy(NewArgv, argv, argc * sizeof(char *));
@@ -408,8 +410,12 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
(void) close(fd);
}
/* User may have overridden environment resetting via the -E flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv)
/*
* We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user
* specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs.
*/
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) ||
(ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv))
def_env_reset = FALSE;
/* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
@@ -554,7 +560,14 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
char *editor = find_editor(&edit_argv);
if (!editor)
goto done;
command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("command", editor);
} else {
command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("command", safe_cmnd);
}
if (def_stay_setuid) {
easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_uid=%u", user_uid);
easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_gid=%u", user_gid);
@@ -589,7 +602,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
*command_infop = command_info;
*argv_out = NewArgv;
*argv_out = edit_argv ? edit_argv : NewArgv;
*user_env_out = env_get(); /* our private copy */
rval = TRUE;
@@ -610,6 +623,16 @@ sudoers_policy_check(int argc, char * const argv[], char *env_add[],
argv_out, user_env_out);
}
static int
sudoers_policy_sudoedit(int argc, char * const argv[], char *env_add[],
char **command_infop[], char **argv_out[], char **user_env_out[])
{
SET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT);
return sudoers_policy_main(argc, argv, 0, env_add, command_infop,
argv_out, user_env_out);
}
static int
sudoers_policy_validate(void)
{
@@ -658,7 +681,7 @@ init_vars(char * const envp[])
{
char * const * ep;
#if 0
#if 0 /* XXX */
/* Sanity check command from user. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX)
errorx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
@@ -1300,6 +1323,80 @@ deserialize_info(char * const settings[], char * const user_info[])
return flags;
}
static char *
resolve_editor(char *editor, char ***argv_out)
{
char *cp, **nargv, *editor_path = NULL;
int ac, nargc, wasblank;
/*
* Split editor into an argument vector; editor is reused (do not free).
* The EDITOR and VISUAL environment variables may contain command
* line args so look for those and alloc space for them too.
*/
nargc = 1;
for (wasblank = FALSE, cp = editor; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (isblank((unsigned char) *cp))
wasblank = TRUE;
else if (wasblank) {
wasblank = FALSE;
nargc++;
}
}
/* If we can't find the editor in the user's PATH, give up. */
cp = strtok(editor, " \t");
if (cp == NULL ||
find_path(cp, &editor_path, NULL, getenv("PATH"), 0) != FOUND) {
return NULL;
}
nargv = (char **) emalloc2(nargc + 1, sizeof(char *));
for (ac = 0; cp != NULL && ac < nargc; ac++) {
nargv[ac] = cp;
cp = strtok(NULL, " \t");
}
nargv[ac] = NULL;
*argv_out = nargv;
return editor_path;
}
/*
* Determine which editor to use. We don't need to worry about restricting
* this to a "safe" editor since it runs with the uid of the invoking user,
* not the runas (privileged) user.
*/
static char *
find_editor(char ***argv_out)
{
char *cp, *editor, *editor_path = NULL, **ev, *ev0[4];
/*
* If any of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL or EDITOR are set, choose the first one.
*/
ev0[0] = "SUDO_EDITOR";
ev0[1] = "VISUAL";
ev0[2] = "EDITOR";
ev0[3] = NULL;
for (ev = ev0; *ev != NULL; ev++) {
if ((editor = getenv(*ev)) != NULL && *editor != '\0') {
editor_path = resolve_editor(editor, argv_out);
if (editor_path != NULL)
break;
}
}
if (editor_path == NULL) {
editor = estrdup(def_editor);
if ((cp = strchr(editor, ':')) != NULL)
*cp = '\0'; /* def_editor could be a path */
editor_path = resolve_editor(cp, argv_out);
}
if (!editor_path) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, "%s: command not found", editor);
warningx("%s: command not found", editor);
}
return editor_path;
}
struct policy_plugin sudoers_policy = {
SUDO_POLICY_PLUGIN,
SUDO_API_VERSION,
@@ -1309,7 +1406,8 @@ struct policy_plugin sudoers_policy = {
sudoers_policy_check,
sudoers_policy_list,
sudoers_policy_validate,
sudoers_policy_invalidate
sudoers_policy_invalidate,
sudoers_policy_sudoedit
};
struct io_plugin sudoers_io = {

9
src/Makefile.in
View File

@@ -72,11 +72,9 @@ SHELL = /bin/sh
PROGS = @PROGS@
# XXX - add back missing ones:
# sudo_edit.o
OBJS = sudo.o parse_args.o lbuf.o alloc.o error.o zero_bytes.o \
load_plugins.o conversation.o list.o fmt_string.o tgetpass.o \
fileops.o term.o ttysize.o atobool.o script.o pty.o @SUDO_OBJS@
OBJS = alloc.o atobool.o conversation.o error.o fileops.o fmt_string.o \
gettime.o lbuf.o list.o load_plugins.o parse_args.o pty.o script.o \
sudo.o sudo_edit.o term.o tgetpass.o ttysize.o zero_bytes.o @SUDO_OBJS@
LIBOBJDIR = $(top_builddir)/@ac_config_libobj_dir@/
@@ -115,6 +113,7 @@ conversation.o: $(srcdir)/conversation.c $(SUDODEP)
error.o: $(srcdir)/error.c $(incdir)/compat.h $(incdir)/error.h $(top_builddir)/config.h
fileops.o: $(srcdir)/fileops.c $(SUDODEP)
fmt_string.o: $(srcdir)/fmt_string.c $(incdir)/compat.h $(top_builddir)/config.h
gettime.o: $(srcdir)/gettime.c $(incdir)/compat.h $(top_builddir)/config.h
lbuf.o: $(srcdir)/lbuf.c $(SUDODEP)
list.o: $(srcdir)/list.c $(SUDODEP)
load_plugins.o: $(srcdir)/load_plugins.c $(SUDODEP)

0
plugins/sudoers/gettime.c → src/gettime.c
View File

7
src/parse_args.c
View File

@@ -418,6 +418,13 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, char ***settingsp,
}
settings[j] = NULL;
/* Must have the command in argv[0]. */
if (mode == MODE_EDIT) {
argc++;
argv--;
argv[0] = "sudoedit";
}
*settingsp = settings;
*env_addp = env_add;
*nargc = argc;

32
src/sudo.c
View File

@@ -93,8 +93,6 @@ static void disable_coredumps(void);
static char **get_user_info(struct user_details *);
static void command_info_to_details(char * const info[],
struct command_details *details);
static int run_command(struct command_details *details, char *argv[],
char *envp[]);
/* XXX - header file */
extern const char *list_user, *runas_user, *runas_group;
@@ -109,7 +107,7 @@ static struct rlimit corelimit;
int
main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
{
int nargc, sudo_mode;
int nargc, sudo_mode, exitcode = 0;
char **nargv, **settings, **env_add;
char **user_info, **command_info, **argv_out, **user_env_out;
struct plugin_container *plugin, *next;
@@ -200,9 +198,22 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LONG_LIST), list_user);
}
exit(ok != TRUE);
case MODE_EDIT:
if (!policy_plugin.u.policy->check_sudoedit)
errorx(1, "policy plugin %s does not support sudoedit",
policy_plugin.name);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case MODE_RUN:
if (sudo_mode & MODE_EDIT) {
/* XXX - must be able to tell which are the files in argv */
/* as opposed to editor flags; could use original argv */
/* and only use argv_out for the command path + args */
ok = policy_plugin.u.policy->check_sudoedit(nargc, nargv,
env_add, &command_info, &argv_out, &user_env_out);
} else {
ok = policy_plugin.u.policy->check_policy(nargc, nargv, env_add,
&command_info, &argv_out, &user_env_out);
}
sudo_debug(8, "policy plugin returns %d", ok);
if (ok != TRUE) {
if (ok == -2)
@@ -234,15 +245,16 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
/* run_command will call the close method for us */
run_command(&command_details, argv_out, user_env_out);
break;
case MODE_EDIT:
/* XXX - fill in */
if (sudo_mode & MODE_EDIT) {
exitcode = sudo_edit(&command_details, argv_out, nargv + 1, user_env_out);
} else {
exitcode = run_command(&command_details, argv_out, user_env_out);
}
break;
default:
errorx(1, "unexpected sudo mode 0x%x", sudo_mode);
}
exit(0);
exit(exitcode);
}
/*
@@ -744,7 +756,7 @@ done:
/*
* Run the command and wait for it to complete.
*/
static int
int
run_command(struct command_details *details, char *argv[], char *envp[])
{
struct plugin_container *plugin;
@@ -790,7 +802,7 @@ run_command(struct command_details *details, char *argv[], char *envp[])
warningx("unexpected child termination condition: %d", cstat.type);
break;
}
exit(exitcode);
return exitcode;
}
/*

22
src/sudo.h
View File

@@ -74,19 +74,6 @@
#define MODE_NONINTERACTIVE 0x00800000
#define MODE_LONG_LIST 0x01000000
/*
* Used with set_perms()
*/
#define PERM_ROOT 0x00
#define PERM_USER 0x01
#define PERM_FULL_USER 0x02
#define PERM_SUDOERS 0x03
#define PERM_RUNAS 0x04
#define PERM_FULL_RUNAS 0x05
#define PERM_TIMESTAMP 0x06
#define PERM_NOEXIT 0x10 /* flag */
#define PERM_MASK 0xf0
/*
* We used to use the system definition of PASS_MAX or _PASSWD_LEN,
* but that caused problems with various alternate authentication
@@ -199,12 +186,21 @@ void get_ttysize(int *linep, int *colp);
/* sudo.c */
int exec_setup(struct command_details *details);
int run_command(struct command_details *details, char *argv[],
char *envp[]);
extern int debug_level;
extern struct plugin_container_list io_plugins;
/* sudo_edit.c */
int sudo_edit(struct command_details *details, char *argv[], char *files[],
char *envp[]);
/* parse_args.c */
void usage(int) __attribute__((__noreturn__));
/* gettime.c */
int gettime(struct timeval *);
#ifndef errno
extern int errno;
#endif

280
src/sudo_edit.c
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
* Copyright (c) 2004-2008, 2010 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#include <ctype.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -49,37 +50,63 @@
#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <time.h>
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TIMESPEC
# include <compat/timespec.h>
#endif
#include "sudo.h"
extern char **environ;
extern struct user_details user_details;
static char *find_editor();
static void
switch_user(uid_t euid, gid_t egid, int ngroups, GETGROUPS_T *groups)
{
int serrno = errno;
/* When restoring root, change euid first; otherwise change it last. */
if (euid == ROOT_UID) {
if (seteuid(ROOT_UID) != 0)
error(1, "seteuid(ROOT_UID)");
}
if (ngroups != -1) {
if (setgroups(ngroups, groups) != 0)
error(1, "setgroups");
}
if (setegid(egid) != 0)
error(1, "setegid(%d)", (int)egid);
if (euid != ROOT_UID) {
if (seteuid(euid) != 0)
error(1, "seteuid(%d)", (int)euid);
}
errno = serrno;
}
/*
* Wrapper to allow users to edit privileged files with their own uid.
*/
int
sudo_edit(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
sudo_edit(struct command_details *command_details, char *argv[], char *files[],
char *envp[])
{
struct command_details editor_details;
ssize_t nread, nwritten;
pid_t kidpid, pid;
const char *tmpdir;
char **nargv, **ap, *editor, *cp;
char **nargv, **ap, *cp;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
int error, i, ac, ofd, tfd, nargc, rval, tmplen, wasblank;
int retval, i, j, ac, ofd, tfd, nargc, nfiles, rval, tmplen;
struct stat sb;
struct timespec ts1, ts2;
struct timeval tv, tv1, tv2;
struct tempfile {
char *tfile;
char *ofile;
struct timespec omtim;
struct timeval omtim;
off_t osize;
} *tf;
/*
* Set real, effective and saved uids to root.
* We will change the euid as needed below.
*/
setuid(ROOT_UID);
/*
* Find our temporary directory, one of /var/tmp, /usr/tmp, or /tmp
*/
@@ -99,54 +126,57 @@ sudo_edit(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
* Close password, shadow, and group files before we try to open
* user-specified files to prevent the opening of things like /dev/fd/4
*/
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
endpwent();
endgrent();
/*
* For each file specified by the user, make a temporary version
* and copy the contents of the original to it.
*/
tf = emalloc2(argc - 1, sizeof(*tf));
zero_bytes(tf, (argc - 1) * sizeof(*tf));
for (i = 0, ap = argv + 1; i < argc - 1 && *ap != NULL; i++, ap++) {
error = -1;
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
if ((ofd = open(*ap, O_RDONLY, 0644)) != -1 || errno == ENOENT) {
for (nfiles = 0; files[nfiles] != NULL; nfiles++)
continue;
tf = emalloc2(nfiles, sizeof(*tf));
zero_bytes(tf, nfiles * sizeof(*tf));
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < nfiles; i++) {
retval = -1;
switch_user(command_details->euid, command_details->egid,
command_details->ngroups, command_details->groups);
if ((ofd = open(files[i], O_RDONLY, 0644)) != -1 || errno == ENOENT) {
if (ofd == -1) {
zero_bytes(&sb, sizeof(sb)); /* new file */
error = 0;
retval = 0;
} else {
#ifdef HAVE_FSTAT
error = fstat(ofd, &sb);
retval = fstat(ofd, &sb);
#else
error = stat(tf[i].ofile, &sb);
retval = stat(tf[j].ofile, &sb);
#endif
}
}
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (error || (ofd != -1 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))) {
if (error)
warning("%s", *ap);
switch_user(ROOT_UID, user_details.egid,
user_details.ngroups, user_details.groups);
if (retval || (ofd != -1 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))) {
if (retval)
warning("%s", files[i]);
else
warningx("%s: not a regular file", *ap);
warningx("%s: not a regular file", files[i]);
if (ofd != -1)
close(ofd);
argc--;
i--;
continue;
}
tf[i].ofile = *ap;
tf[i].omtim.tv_sec = mtim_getsec(sb);
tf[i].omtim.tv_nsec = mtim_getnsec(sb);
tf[i].osize = sb.st_size;
if ((cp = strrchr(tf[i].ofile, '/')) != NULL)
tf[j].ofile = files[i];
tf[j].osize = sb.st_size;
mtim_get(&sb, &tf[j].omtim);
if ((cp = strrchr(tf[j].ofile, '/')) != NULL)
cp++;
else
cp = tf[i].ofile;
easprintf(&tf[i].tfile, "%.*s/%s.XXXXXXXX", tmplen, tmpdir, cp);
set_perms(PERM_USER);
tfd = mkstemp(tf[i].tfile);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
cp = tf[j].ofile;
easprintf(&tf[j].tfile, "%.*s/%s.XXXXXXXX", tmplen, tmpdir, cp);
if (seteuid(user_details.uid) != 0)
error(1, "seteuid(%d)", (int)user_details.uid);
tfd = mkstemp(tf[j].tfile);
if (seteuid(ROOT_UID) != 0)
error(1, "seteuid(ROOT_UID)");
if (tfd == -1) {
warning("mkstemp");
goto cleanup;
@@ -155,9 +185,9 @@ sudo_edit(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
while ((nread = read(ofd, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) {
if ((nwritten = write(tfd, buf, nread)) != nread) {
if (nwritten == -1)
warning("%s", tf[i].tfile);
warning("%s", tf[j].tfile);
else
warningx("%s: short write", tf[i].tfile);
warningx("%s: short write", tf[j].tfile);
goto cleanup;
}
}
@@ -170,104 +200,67 @@ sudo_edit(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
* resides. It is OK if touch() fails since we only use the info
* to determine whether or not a file has been modified.
*/
(void) touch(tfd, NULL, &tf[i].omtim);
(void) touch(tfd, NULL, &tf[j].omtim);
#ifdef HAVE_FSTAT
error = fstat(tfd, &sb);
retval = fstat(tfd, &sb);
#else
error = stat(tf[i].tfile, &sb);
retval = stat(tf[j].tfile, &sb);
#endif
if (!error) {
tf[i].omtim.tv_sec = mtim_getsec(sb);
tf[i].omtim.tv_nsec = mtim_getnsec(sb);
}
if (!retval)
mtim_get(&sb, &tf[j].omtim);
close(tfd);
j++;
}
if (argc == 1)
if (nfiles == 0)
return(1); /* no files readable, you lose */
environ = envp;
editor = find_editor();
/*
* Allocate space for the new argument vector and fill it in.
* The EDITOR and VISUAL environment variables may contain command
* line args so look for those and alloc space for them too.
* We concatenate argv (the editor with its args) and the file list
* to create a new argv.
*/
nargc = argc;
for (wasblank = FALSE, cp = editor; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (isblank((unsigned char) *cp))
wasblank = TRUE;
else if (wasblank) {
wasblank = FALSE;
nargc++;
}
}
for (ap = argv; *ap != NULL; ap++)
continue;
nargc = (int)(ap - argv) + nfiles;
nargv = (char **) emalloc2(nargc + 1, sizeof(char *));
ac = 0;
for ((cp = strtok(editor, " \t")); cp != NULL; (cp = strtok(NULL, " \t")))
nargv[ac++] = cp;
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1 && ac < nargc; )
for (ap = argv; *ap != NULL; ap++)
nargv[ac++] = *ap;
for (i = 0; i < nfiles && ac < nargc; )
nargv[ac++] = tf[i++].tfile;
nargv[ac] = NULL;
/*
* Fork and exec the editor with the invoking user's creds,
* Run the editor with the invoking user's creds,
* keeping track of the time spent in the editor.
*/
gettime(&ts1);
kidpid = fork();
if (kidpid == -1) {
warning("fork");
goto cleanup;
} else if (kidpid == 0) {
/* child */
set_perms(PERM_FULL_USER);
closefrom(def_closefrom);
execvp(nargv[0], nargv);
warning("unable to execute %s", nargv[0]);
_exit(127);
}
/*
* Wait for status from the child. Most modern kernels
* will not let an unprivileged child process send a
* signal to its privileged parent so we have to request
* status when the child is stopped and then send the
* same signal to our own pid.
*/
do {
#ifdef sudo_waitpid
pid = sudo_waitpid(kidpid, &i, WUNTRACED);
#else
pid = wait(&i);
#endif
if (pid == kidpid) {
if (WIFSTOPPED(i))
kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(i));
else
break;
}
} while (pid != -1 || errno == EINTR);
gettime(&ts2);
if (pid == -1 || !WIFEXITED(i))
rval = 1;
else
rval = WEXITSTATUS(i);
gettime(&tv1);
memcpy(&editor_details, command_details, sizeof(editor_details));
editor_details.uid = user_details.uid;
editor_details.euid = user_details.uid;
editor_details.gid = user_details.gid;
editor_details.egid = user_details.gid;
editor_details.ngroups = user_details.ngroups;
editor_details.groups = user_details.groups;
rval = run_command(&editor_details, nargv, envp);
gettime(&tv2);
/* Copy contents of temp files to real ones */
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
error = -1;
set_perms(PERM_USER);
for (i = 0; i < nfiles; i++) {
retval = -1;
if (seteuid(user_details.uid) != 0)
error(1, "seteuid(%d)", (int)user_details.uid);
if ((tfd = open(tf[i].tfile, O_RDONLY, 0644)) != -1) {
#ifdef HAVE_FSTAT
error = fstat(tfd, &sb);
retval = fstat(tfd, &sb);
#else
error = stat(tf[i].tfile, &sb);
retval = stat(tf[i].tfile, &sb);
#endif
}
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (error || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
if (error)
if (seteuid(ROOT_UID) != 0)
error(1, "seteuid(ROOT_UID)");
if (retval || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
if (retval)
warning("%s", tf[i].tfile);
else
warningx("%s: not a regular file", tf[i].tfile);
@@ -276,27 +269,29 @@ sudo_edit(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
close(tfd);
continue;
}
if (tf[i].osize == sb.st_size && tf[i].omtim.tv_sec == mtim_getsec(sb)
&& tf[i].omtim.tv_nsec == mtim_getnsec(sb)) {
mtim_get(&sb, &tv);
if (tf[i].osize == sb.st_size && timercmp(&tf[i].omtim, &tv, ==)) {
/*
* If mtime and size match but the user spent no measurable
* time in the editor we can't tell if the file was changed.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_TIMESPECSUB2
timespecsub(&ts1, &ts2);
#ifdef HAVE_TIMERSUB2
timersub(&tv1, &tv2);
#else
timespecsub(&ts1, &ts2, &ts2);
timersub(&tv1, &tv2, &tv2);
#endif
if (timespecisset(&ts2)) {
if (timerisset(&tv2)) {
warningx("%s unchanged", tf[i].ofile);
unlink(tf[i].tfile);
close(tfd);
continue;
}
}
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
switch_user(command_details->euid, command_details->egid,
command_details->ngroups, command_details->groups);
ofd = open(tf[i].ofile, O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_CREAT, 0644);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
switch_user(ROOT_UID, user_details.egid,
user_details.ngroups, user_details.groups);
if (ofd == -1) {
warning("unable to write to %s", tf[i].ofile);
warningx("contents of edit session left in %s", tf[i].tfile);
@@ -328,46 +323,9 @@ sudo_edit(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
return(rval);
cleanup:
/* Clean up temp files and return. */
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
for (i = 0; i < nfiles; i++) {
if (tf[i].tfile != NULL)
unlink(tf[i].tfile);
}
return(1);
}
/*
* Determine which editor to use. We don't bother restricting this
* based on def_env_editor or def_editor since the editor runs with
* the uid of the invoking user, not the runas (privileged) user.
*/
static char *
find_editor(void)
{
char *cp, *editor = NULL, **ev, *ev0[4];
ev0[0] = "SUDO_EDITOR";
ev0[1] = "VISUAL";
ev0[2] = "EDITOR";
ev0[3] = NULL;
for (ev = ev0; *ev != NULL; ev++) {
if ((editor = getenv(*ev)) != NULL && *editor != '\0') {
if ((cp = strrchr(editor, '/')) != NULL)
cp++;
else
cp = editor;
/* Ignore "sudoedit" and "sudo" to avoid an endless loop. */
if (strncmp(cp, "sudo", 4) != 0 ||
(cp[4] != ' ' && cp[4] != '\0' && strcmp(cp + 4, "edit") != 0)) {
editor = estrdup(editor);
break;
}
}
editor = NULL;
}
if (editor == NULL) {
editor = estrdup(def_editor);
if ((cp = strchr(editor, ':')) != NULL)
*cp = '\0'; /* def_editor could be a path */
}
return(editor);
}