Mention noexec
This commit is contained in:
12
sudo.man.in
12
sudo.man.in
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
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.\" Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
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.\" Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
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.\"
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.\"
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.\" $Sudo$
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.\" $Sudo$
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.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man v1.34, Pod::Parser v1.13
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.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man v1.37, Pod::Parser v1.13
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.\"
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.\"
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.\" Standard preamble:
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.\" Standard preamble:
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.\" ========================================================================
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.\" ========================================================================
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@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
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.\" ========================================================================
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.\" ========================================================================
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.\"
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.\"
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.IX Title "SUDO @mansectsu@"
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.IX Title "SUDO @mansectsu@"
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.TH SUDO @mansectsu@ "March 13, 2003" "1.6.7" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS"
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.TH SUDO @mansectsu@ "January 9, 2004" "1.6.8" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS"
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.SH "NAME"
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.SH "NAME"
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sudo \- execute a command as another user
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sudo \- execute a command as another user
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.SH "SYNOPSIS"
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.SH "SYNOPSIS"
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@@ -498,8 +498,12 @@ and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed.
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See the \s-1LICENSE\s0 file distributed with \fBsudo\fR for complete details.
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See the \s-1LICENSE\s0 file distributed with \fBsudo\fR for complete details.
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.SH "CAVEATS"
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.SH "CAVEATS"
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.IX Header "CAVEATS"
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.IX Header "CAVEATS"
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There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell if
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There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell
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that user has access to commands allowing shell escapes.
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if that user is allowed to run arbitrary commands via \fBsudo\fR.
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Also, many programs (such as editors) allow the user to run commands
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via shell escapes, thus avoiding \fBsudo\fR's checks. However, on
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most systems it is possible to prevent shell escapes with \fBsudo\fR's
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\&\fInoexec\fR functionality. See the \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) manual for details.
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.PP
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.PP
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If users have sudo \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR there is nothing to prevent them from creating
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If users have sudo \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR there is nothing to prevent them from creating
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their own program that gives them a root shell regardless of any '!'
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their own program that gives them a root shell regardless of any '!'
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8
sudo.pod
8
sudo.pod
@@ -388,8 +388,12 @@ See the LICENSE file distributed with B<sudo> for complete details.
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=head1 CAVEATS
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=head1 CAVEATS
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There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell if
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There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell
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that user has access to commands allowing shell escapes.
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if that user is allowed to run arbitrary commands via B<sudo>.
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Also, many programs (such as editors) allow the user to run commands
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via shell escapes, thus avoiding B<sudo>'s checks. However, on
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most systems it is possible to prevent shell escapes with B<sudo>'s
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I<noexec> functionality. See the sudoers(5) manual for details.
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If users have sudo C<ALL> there is nothing to prevent them from creating
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If users have sudo C<ALL> there is nothing to prevent them from creating
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their own program that gives them a root shell regardless of any '!'
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their own program that gives them a root shell regardless of any '!'
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